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INTRODUCTION
From the moment they emerged, humans have attempted to
influence their surroundings. A chief example is human use of
plants and animals for food and medicinal purposes. Human
insight into the physical characteristics of plants and animals has
led to continuous efforts to strengthen preferred characteristics and
to eliminate disfavored ones. By crossing and selection of animals
and plants, humans have been able to accumulate preferred
characteristics of parent animals in their offspring.
Human capability to alter the biological constitution of animals
and plants has always been limited. Human influence has
extended only to the conditions under which autonomous
biological processes, such as natural reproduction, took place and
even that influence was relatively small. This limited influence
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was due in part to scientists’ inability to interbreed animals
belonging to different species due to physiological differences.1
Other limitations stemmed from the long reproduction process, the
uncertainty of outcomes, and the possibility that parents’ negative
characteristics would be expressed in their offspring.
Advances in genetics have broadened human capability to alter
plants and animals. Understanding the distinctive hereditary
characteristics of organisms and the reasons for their expression
has spurred a revolutionary change in the biological discipline.
The knowledge acquired by scientists in the past 150 years has
made manipulation of the biochemical compounds and processes
that determine the formation of hereditary characteristics possible.
Biotechnology enables organic alteration of biological material,
such as animals.
The development of biotechnology has removed the initial
barrier between biology and technology. To a certain extent, life
has a technical character that can be subjected to human-based
technologies resulting in a kind of evolution on command.
Accordingly, biology has changed from a merely descriptive
science into one with concrete applications. This change has
enabled biotechnology to become subject matter protected under
patent law.
Patent law has been the natural source of protection for
biotechnology. It gives an inventor the right to exclude others
from using his patented invention for a certain period of time.
Traditionally, “life” was not covered under patent law. Although
this exclusion started to change in the nineteenth century because
of advances in microbiology, multicellular organisms such as
plants and animals remained outside of the scope of patent law
until far into the twentieth century.2 Patent law adapted in scope to
1

See HENDERSON’S DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGICAL TERMS 507 (12th ed. 2000) (defining
species as a group of interbreeding individuals not normally able to interbreed with other
such groups and subdivided into subspecies, geographic races and varieties). A
geographic race is a group of individuals within a species which forms a permanent and
genetically distinguishable variety. Id. at 204. A variety is a taxonomic group below the
species level. Id. at 578. Varieties are variances; deviations from the mean. Id.
2
See infra Part II.C–D (discussing the expansion of patent law doctrine to
accommodate biotechnology).
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include protection for multicellular organisms. These organisms
have led to key biotechnological inventions in the past fifty years.
The genetic transformation of agricultural and other animals
has had widespread effects. Transformation of animals led to the
production of new and better medicines and improved nutrition.
The “creation” of animals in which “human” genetic diseases, such
as certain cancers develop in vivo,3 has facilitated research of
cancer prevention, detection, and treatment. Moreover, genetic
modification has enabled animals to thrive in environments in
which originally they could not survive and thereby has had great
strides in the battle against hunger. Biotechnology has also led to
the development of enzymes that destroy pollutants and modified
organisms that benefit security and defense by breaking down
dangerous gases.
The universal and far-reaching consequences of biotechnology
have stimulated research and development. The number of patent
applications filed globally for biotechnological inventions
increases every year, while many patents for modified animals
already exist. The development of animal biotechnological
inventions is particularly important for the realization of
biotechnological promise.
The conditions under which biotechnological inventions are
patentable influence the pace of such realization. The scope of
patentability has a profound impact on the incentive to invest in
biotechnology.
Biotechnological research and development
depends mostly on private market actors. These actors are
companies that focus on biotechnological development, creation,
and marketing of products therefrom. The differing patentability
standards that exist in different countries may create an uneven
playing field. Because genetic modification of animals may have
great and far-reaching consequences on evolution, it is important to
address the extent of human participation in this process. From the
human perspective, the scope of patentability plays a critical role.
The standards for patentability of animal biotechnological
inventions must be determined responsibly and evaluated
3

See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1951 (26th ed. 1995) (defining in vivo as in
“the living body, referring to a process or reaction occurring therein”).
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accurately. The presumed universal reach of biotechnology and
the primarily international focus of the actors involved in its
development and application demands harmonization of the major
patent regimes involved.
Harmonization of patent law is necessary to reduce regional
trade barriers that derive from differing standards of patentability.
Moreover, harmonization is critical to infuse “responsible”
limitations into standards of patentability. For patenting modified
animals, the important regimes are the United States (U.S.), the
European Union (EU), and Japan. Harmonization means that
compromises must be made. Certain approaches will be adapted
and adopted, while others will be abolished entirely.
This Article focuses on the patentability of animals under the
patent regimes of the U.S. and EU. Differences and similarities
will be described along with preferences relevant to particular
inventions. The applicable law and scholarly opinions will be
reviewed. Relevant biotechnological and ethical realities will be
considered.4
The Article is divided into five Parts. Part I will describe the
disciplines involved, introducing the reader to the fields of
genetics, biotechnology, and patent law. Part II will describe the
legal basis of U.S. patent law, its requirements and exclusions.
Additionally, it will concentrate on animal patents in the U.S., in
light of applicable statutes, case law, and guidelines promulgated
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Part III will
discuss the legal basis of EU patent law, its requirements and
4

This work covers a broad and interdisciplinary field. Given the limited scope of this
article and the number of complex issues that arise when comparing specific rules of law
in different cultures, an analysis of the Japanese regime is not included. The legal
perspective will be the starting point of analysis, whereas other perspectives will be
considered to the extent that they are useful. In view of the breadth of this field, and the
numerous issues and questions that arise in its exploration, this work cannot be
exhaustive. Furthermore, legal regimes and positions will be reviewed that operate in
different legal traditions, such as the U.S. common law and continental EU civil law.
While many possible solutions are similar, the approach taken may differ. For example,
the common law tradition addresses legal problems on a case-by-case basis, whereas in
the civil law tradition, legislatures anticipate potential problems and attempt to
preemptively tackle them by enacting statutes and regulations. Although these general
differences will arise in the course of this article, it is difficult to offer a comprehensive
analysis given the limited scope of this article.
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exclusions, and EU patentability standards. Part IV will offer a
comparison of the patentability of animals in the EU and the U.S.
It will focus on the differences in standards, exclusions, and scopes
of patentability in both countries. Part V will focus on the need to
bridge the animal biotechnological gaps between the U.S. and EU
and a way to harmonize their differences. A brief proposal for
harmonization of the substantive provisions affecting the manner
in which transgenic animals are patented under both regimes is
included.
I. GENETICS, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND PATENT LAW
A. Genetics
The term “genetics”5 originates from the Greek words
“genesis” (origin) and “genetès” (originator) and the Latin terms
“genus” (nature), “generalis” (specific), and “generatio”
(origination). The term “genetics” is much newer than the terms
from which it derives. Indeed, the roots of the science of heredity
lie in the nineteenth century.
Scholars commonly regard the Austrian monk Gregor Mendel
as the founding father of the science of heredity and, therefore, of
modern genetics.6 Mendel experimented with the hybridization of
split peas and discovered a pattern in which two plants passed
distinctive characteristics onto their offspring.7 Mendel discovered
that certain biological compounds play a role in the hereditary
process. He published his discoveries in 1866.8
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Dutch botanist
de Vries and the English biologist Bateson repeated Mendel’s
5
See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 713 (defining genetics as the
branch of science concerned with the means and consequences of transmission and
generation of the components of biological inheritance).
6
See generally ELDON JOHN GARDNER ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS 15 (8th ed.
1991).
7
See generally JAMES DARNELL ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 5–6 (2d ed. 1990).
8
Gregor Mendel, Versuche uber Pfanzenhybriden [Experiments with Plant
Hybridization], Natural Scientific Association of Brno, reprinted in MENDEL’S
PRINCIPLES OF HEREDITY 335–79 (William Bateson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 3d ed.
1913) (1866).
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experiments.
Bateson and de Vries confirmed Mendel’s
conclusions and from then on, scientists started to search for the
carriers of heredity. Even before the 20th century, cell research
had emerged. In 1869, the Swiss researcher Kossel discovered that
a cell nucleus contains protein and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).9
He further discovered that DNA not only consists of a phosphate
backbone,10 but also of nucleic acid made up of four nucleotide
bases: adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G),
and a sugar (deoxyribose). In 1882, the German researcher, Walter
Flemming, discovered that threadlike structures, known as mitotic
spindles, exist in the nucleus.11 Flemming’s experiments showed
that mitotic spindles multiply upon cell division and that every new
cell contains one identical structure of the “mothercell.”12
In 1952, the research of Americans Alfred Hershey and Martha
Chase showed that DNA penetrated the cell walls of bacteria,
while the viral proteins did not.13 They concluded that DNA is the
carrier of hereditary material.14 The next year, the American
scientist, James D. Watson, together with his English colleague,
Francis H. Crick, characterized the physical structure of DNA—the
double helix.15
The strands of the double helix are
complementary; the nucleotide bases A and T pair with one
another, as do the bases C and G. Watson and Crick’s model
demonstrated that the hereditary code must be determined by the
9

See Dr. Frederick A. Aldrich, Sciencefare, GAZETTE, Mar. 18, 1997, at 2 (stating that
in “work for which he received the Nobel Prize in Medicine and Physiology in 1910, a
German biochemist named Albrecht Kossel was able to isolate, by hydrolysis from
Meischer’s nucleic acid, a series of four nitrogen-bearing compounds or bases which he
called adenine, guanine, cytosine and thymine”), available at http://www.mun.ca/sgs/
science.march1877.html.
10
See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1354 (defining phosphate as
a salt or ester of phosphoric acid).
11
See generally DARNELL, supra note 7, at 7.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 11.
14
Id.
15
Id.; see also STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 768 (defining helix
as a “line in a shape of a coil . . . , each point being equidistant from a straight line that is
the axis of the cylinder in which each point of the h[elix] lies”); id. at 769 (explaining that
a double helix is the “helical structure assumed by two strands of DNA, held together
throughout their length by hydrogen bombs between bases on opposite strands, referred
to as Watson-Crick base pairing”).
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linear sequence of the four bases on the strings.16 Watson and
Crick further determined that upon cell division, the DNA is
replicated. During replication, the double helix disentangles and
the two strands move apart. Every strand functions as a template
for the formation of a new strand, of which the bases will
subsequently pair with the complementary bases. Although
Watson and Crick clarified the structure and formation of DNA, it
took several years to determine DNA’s manner of expression and
the way to decipher its code.
Scientists moved closer to deciphering DNA’s code when the
functioning of enzymes involved in protein synthesis was clarified
and in vitro17 translation systems were developed. As a result of
these developments, it became possible to decipher the genetic
code. In 1972, the first successful genetic manipulation was
achieved, and recombinant-DNA18 was produced.19 In that same
year, scientists effectuated an important biotechnological
application of recombinant DNA technology, i.e., the production of
human growth hormone.
B. Biotechnology
DNA is a polymer of nucleotides.20 A nucleotide consists of
three components—a five-carbon sugar, an inorganic phosphate,
and a nitrogen base.21 As previously mentioned, DNA contains the
bases A, G, T, and C.22 The way the genetic code is constituted is
the same in any organism. Hence, the species restriction that exists
with breeding and selection does not exist at the biochemical level.
In all organisms, the structure of DNA is formed by two
16

See DARNELL, supra note 7, at 11.
See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 889 (defining in vitro as a
process or reaction occurring in an artificial environment, as in a test tube or culture
media).
18
See id. at 1511 (defining recombinant-DNA [hereinafter “rec-DNA”] as “[a]ltered
DNA resulting from the insertion into the chain, by chemical, enzymatic, or biological
means, of a sequence (a whole or partial chain of DNA) not originally (biologically)
present in that chain”).
19
See GARDNER, supra note 6, at 18.
20
See generally id. at 92–127 (describing the constitution and functioning of DNA).
21
See id. at 97.
22
See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
17
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intertwined polynucleotides, which are held together by nitrogen
bonds. The complementary bases are paired, A with T and G with
C. A group of three bases is called a triplet.23 A triplet codes for a
specific amino acid. A combination of amino acids, encoded by a
combination of triplets, comprises a particular protein with a
particular function. All combined triplets form the entire genetic
code of an organism.24
Through processes known as
transcription25 and translation,26 genes are expressed and the
formation of particular proteins and ultimately all physiological
features of an organism are determined.
The use of recombinant-DNA (hereinafter “rec-DNA”) permits
genetic engineering and the genetic modification of organisms.27
This technology allows for the recombination of genetic material
of more than one organism. Genes can be introduced and removed
or blocked. An organism in which foreign material from an
organism of a different species is introduced is called transgenic.28
Restriction enzymes are crucial for the formation of rec-DNA
because they recognize particular base sequences and cut the DNA
strand at those sites.29 The singular cut DNA strands can have
sticky ends. Uneven DNA of a different source that is cut with the
same restriction enzyme will have the complementary sticky ends.
When DNA fragments so obtained are mixed and joined through a
process known as ligation, rec-DNA is created.30 Often, DNA is
23

See generally STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1856 (stating that a
triplet can be used to describe a group of three bases in DNA and transfer-RNA
[hereinafter “t-RNA”], to be discussed below); id. at 361 (stating that such a group in
messenger-RNA [hereinafter “m-RNA”] is called a codon).
24
The genetic code was deciphered in 1961, and accordingly, the world learned which
combination of triplets codified which proteins. See J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence
of the Human Genome, 291 SCI. 1304 (2001) (describing how scientists around the world
unravelled the human genetic code).
25
See generally STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1836 (stating that
transcription is where the message of the combination is transcribed to the m-RNA).
26
See generally id. (stating that translation is where the message is translated by the tRNA to enable protein synthesis).
27
See id.
28
Id. at 1030.
29
See DARNELL, supra note 7, at 206–12 (describing the formation of rec-DNA in more
detail).
30
See generally STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1655. This is
called “splicing.”
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recombined into certain vehicles employed to transfer DNA
fragments into host cells. These vehicles, most commonly
plasmids31 and viruses,32 are called vectors.33 Cells containing
foreign DNA are often selected on the basis of antibiotic resistance
genes carried by the vector.
Other methods used for the transfer and recombination of
foreign DNA fragments, in vivo34or in vitro,35 are electroporation
(changing the density of cell membranes though electric impulses
whereby DNA can leak in); micro-injection (injecting DNA into
the cell nucleus); nucleus transplantation (replacing the nucleus of
a zygote with a foreign nucleus); DNA gun (bombarding cells with
particles coated with foreign DNA); and cell extraction (mixing
cells as such).36 These methods may be applied in combination
with other technologies, such as cloning, mutagenesis (chemical or
radioactive treatment of cells whereby the DNA is altered),
artificial insemination, embryo transplantation, and embryo
fusion.37 These techniques are applied to animals to serve various
goals, as discussed below.

31
Plasmids are independent circular DNA molecules that have the capability to
replicate within the organism in which they are introduced—and express their DNA.
Plasmids are rapidly exchanged between cells, and transfect the cells easily, which makes
them very suitable for DNA introduction in an organism.
32
Viruses are also used to introduce foreign DNA.
33
See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1911 (defining a vector as
“DNA such as a chromosome or plasmid that autonomously replicates in a cell to which
another DNA segment may be inserted and be itself replicated as in a cloning.” The
Greek Charon, a known vector, was the ferryman who transferred the souls of the
deceased to the next world.).
34
See id. at 1951.
35
See id. at 889.
36
See E.S. VAN DE GRAAF, PATENT LAW AND MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY ABOUT THE REQUIREMENTS AND THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION 28
(1997) (providing further explanation of these methods); Larry Gold & Joseph Alper,
Keeping Pace with Genomics Through Combinatorial Chemistry, 15 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 297 (1997) (Embryo fusion results in animals that are the sum of the
parts of the parents. These animals, called chimaeras, are named after the fire-breathing
chimera in Greek mythology that had the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of
a serpent.).
37
See DARNELL, supra note 7; BIEMANS ET AL., DNA—EEN BLAUWDRUK [DNA—A
BLUEPRINT] 142 (1993).
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C. Goals of Animal Biotechnology
1. Medical Purpose
Genetic modification of animals can serve various medical
purposes. First, animal models can enable researchers to study the
functions of specific genes. Integration of foreign DNA can result
in the expression of new genetic information, but it can also block
the expression of existing genetic information. The gene function
can be identified by blocking expression and observing the
changes that result. Second, genetically-modified animals enable
scientists to learn the expression and workings of genetically
determined hereditary human diseases. For example, a scientist
trying to enhance understanding of a certain cancer may insert
human oncogenes (i.e., cancer-causing genes) into animals to study
their expression in an unnatural environment. Scientists may find
it advantageous to study the function of oncogenes in non-human
mammals. The “Harvard mouse” is an example of an animal that
was created for this purpose.38 Third, genetic modification of
animals may enable scientists to develop gene treatments for
humans based on genetic modification of animals.39 For example,
future treatments for humans with Albinism may stem from gene
therapy of albino mice. Like humans with Albinism, albino mice
have a defect in the tyrosinase enzyme.40 Scientists have cloned
the gene for the tyrosinase enzyme and inserted it into the nuclei of
embryonic albino mice. The treatments succeeded in helping the
embryos grow into pigmented transgenic mice. In the near future,
this treatment, as well as others that have been used successfully in
animals, may be applied successfully to humans.41 Fourth,
38

The “Harvard mouse” enables analysis of human breast cancers. It was modified in
P. Leder’s lab at Harvard and subsequently patented in the U.S. and EU.
39
While gene therapy on fertilized human egg cells has been prohibited worldwide, it
has been conducted successfully on mice.
40
See generally Vitali Alexeev et al., Localized in Vivo Genotypic and Phenotypic
Correction of the Albino Mutation in Skin by RNA-DNA Oligonucleotide, 18 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 43 (2000).
41
In 1993, the first human being underwent onco-gene therapy. The treatment
seenmed to have potential. In 1999, gene therapy on a human being in the U.S. failed
and the patient died—realization of these therapies seems to be harder than once
expected. See Richard A. Morgan & W. French Anderson, Human Gene Therapy, 62
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genetically modified animals could produce important medicinal
proteins.42 The female offspring of Herman the bull, for example,
secrete lactoferrin, a protein used to treat gastroenteritis and bloodpoisoning.43 A human gene introduced into Herman the bull
resulted in a large production of the corresponding protein,
lactoferrin.
2. Veterinary Purpose
Biotechnological alterations can also serve the interests of
modified animals.44 For example, the protein lactoferrin also
protects Herman the bull’s female offspring against udder
Moreover, genetic modification of agricultural
infections.45
animals, like cows, pigs, and chickens, can increase their
productivity. For example, scientists have genetically modified the
bull “Sunny Boy” to increase its productivity. Because of biotechnological alterations, Sunny Boy’s female offspring now
produce extraordinary quantities of milk.46

ANN. REV. BIOTECHNOLOGY 191–217 (1993) (discussing the benefits of oncogene
therapy but recognizing that realization of these therapies seems to be harder than once
expected); Vermij, Het Einde van een Wondertherapie [The End of a Miracle Therapy],
WETENSCHAP & TECHNIEK [SCI. & TECH.], Jan. 13, 2000, at 1. See also Trisha Gura,
After a Setback, Gene Therapy Progresses . . . Gingerly, 291 SCI. 1692 (2001)
(presenting an example of a gene therapy that appears to have great potential for the
treatment of hemophilia).
42
Transgenic animals secrete particular proteins, e.g., in milk.
43
See GARDNER, supra note 6, at 642; Philippe Ducor, Recombinant Products and
Nonobviousness: A Typology, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 3
(1997) (describing production of other medicines, such as erythropoietin (EPO), through
transgenic animals).
44
See Lisa J. Raines, The Mouse That Roared, 1988 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 64.
45
See id. at 67–68.
46
See generally Dan L. Burk, Patenting Trangenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost
Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1635 (1993); Thomas Traian Moga, Transgenic
Animals as Intellectual Property (or the Patented Mouse That Roared), 76 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 511, 530 (1994); Carrie F. Walter, Beyond the Harvard Mouse:
Current Patent Practice and the Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent
Law, 73 IND. L.J. 1025, 1033 (1998).
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3. Socio-Economic Purpose
Agricultural animals may be genetically modified to enable
their exploitation in what once were unsuitable environments. For
example, certain soils can only provide nutrition for
a limited number of cows. If one can increase milk production
of the cows exploited in such an area, fewer animals would be
needed to produce the same amount of milk. This increase in milk
production could boost socio-economic circumstances. A similar
approach might be adopted in creating resistance against certain
diseases, such as sleeping sickness in cows. In Zimbabwe, for
example, sleeping sickness leads to inefficient milk and meat
production. Animal biotechnological research could possibly
eliminate sleeping sickness by creating resistance in genetically
modified animals. These developments could increase life
expectancy in developing countries and contribute positively to
their socio-economic circumstances.47
4. Environmental Purpose
Genetic modification of animals may alter the functioning of
certain organs in their offspring.48 For example, one may alter the
intestinal function of a particular animal so that the amount of
polluting secretions and unpleasant scents decreases. Additionally,

47

Such effects would also lower medical costs. Socioeconomic circumstances will not
change drastically by the development of particular medicines only, because there are
also political, ideological and similar considerations. On the other hand, gene therapy
could be promising as an AIDS treatment in countries like Asia and Africa, where
approximately ninety percent of AIDS patients live. Gene therapy seems to be promising
for treatment of this illness. See Morgan, supra note 41; Ulrich Schatz, Patentability of
Genetic Engineering Inventions in EPO Practise, 1 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 4 (1998). The HIV blocker AZT has been developed through animal
biotechnological research. Distribution of medicines may be problematic, however, in
view of patents held on their active ingredients or methods of treating diseases by
administering claimed compounds. See S. Abdool Karim, Globalization, Ethics and AIDS
Vaccines, 288 SCI. 2129 (2000); Karl Vick, African AIDS Victims Losers of a Drug War;
U.S. Policy Keeps Prices Prohibitive, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1999, at A1.
48
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining that lactoferrin protects female
offspring of Herman the Bull against udder infections).
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animals may be modified so as to break down polluting substances
in their direct environment, such as crude oil.49
D. Patent Law
Legal scholars commonly regard the Arrangement of Venice of
1474 to be the oldest civil law patent statute.50 They consider the
British Statute of Monopolies of 1623 to be the oldest common law
patent statute.51 Patent law grants an inventor the temporary right
to exclude others from the use of his or her technical invention.
Governments, legal scholars, and economists consider
technological innovation to be the most important factor in
increasing productivity. Economic progress requires a continuous
stream of ideas and inventions to improve efficiency in production.
Technological innovation leads to more effective use of labor,
capital, and natural resources. It can thereby lead to higher levels
of productivity with less investment. The subsequent economic
growth, and the concomitant increase in wealth can lead to an
improvement in quality of life, including improved health,
educational, and social conditions.
Despite the great rewards associated with patenting inventions,
they require significant investment.52 Without patent protection,
49

See PIETER VAN DOOREN, DE GENETISCHE REVOLUTIE [THE GENETIC REVOLUTION]
66 (1994).
50
See generally JAN J. BRINKHOF, Over Octrooi en Economie [About Patents and
Economy] 795 (1990) (discussing the Arrangement of Venice statute); cf. Giuli Mandich,
Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 166, 175–81
(1948) (describing the Venetian statute in more detail).
51
The Statute of Monopolies, enacted in 1623, is one of a set of measures on economic
matters enacted by the Tudors in the first quarter of the seventeenth century making use
of proclamations of the king, whereby the statutory law grew in the English common law.
Both the Statute of Monopolies and the Arrangement of Venice were intended to attract
investment and know-how into the respective jurisdictions. The first reference to patents
is thought to have been made by Aristotle. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 36–39 (Stephen Everson
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (360 B.C.E.).
52
Private ownership and enhancement, i.e., the capitalistic economic model, are
necessary assumptions for this argument. See generally BRINKHOF, supra note 50, at
794; Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, In Search of Useful Theory of Innovation, 6
RESEARCH POL’Y 37 (1977). Patent law, however, does not seem to be a prerequisite for
technological innovation. In the nineteenth century, the Netherlands and Switzerland
experienced vast technological and economic development without having patent laws.
In the twentieth century, a similar development occurred in South Korea, partly without
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everyone could profit from the invention and free-ride on the
investment that the inventor alone had to bear. Patents address this
issue by enabling the inventor to recover a profit for a period of
time in which he or she retains exclusivity for this invention. The
inventor can also use this time period to advance the invention.
An important aspect of patent protection is the exchange of
information—the inventor must expose the know-how related to
the invention. This allows others to build on the invention for
experimental purposes, thereby encouraging the continuous flow of
inventions. After the period of patent protection has lapsed, the
previously protected information falls into the public domain so
that society may freely use that information.
The informational function of patent law thereby strengthens
the spread and use of technological expertise.53 The forthcoming
chapters will describe the interaction between patent law and the
development of biotechnological applications within the U.S. and
EU.
II. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A. Legal Basis
The Constitution gives Congress legislative authority to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
applicable patent laws. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 10–11
(1982).
53
See generally L. WICHERS HOETH, KORT BEGRIP VAN HET INTELLECTUELE
EIGENDOMSRECHT [INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW] 10 (1993); ROBERT
M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 67, 191 (1990);
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], INTRODUCTION TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 45 (1997) (discussing further economic
analysis and effect); Michael North, The U.S. Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter:
Creating a Competitive Advantage for Foreign Multinational Companies?, 18 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 111, 112–117 (2000) (providing a comprehensive and concise economic analysis of
corporate behavior and competition within countries with patent regimes); C.
Oppenheim, The Information Function of the Patents, 1979 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP.
REV. 344. But see Ashoka Mody, New Environment for Intellectual Property, World
Bank Industry Series Paper No. 3 (1989) (criticizing the assumption of the stimulative
effect of patent law).
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respective Writings and Discoveries.”54 Congress has used this
authority by enacting the U.S. Patent Act (hereinafter the “Act”).55
The PTO has the authority to examine patent applications and
reject or issue patents.56 The Act is legally operative within the
international framework.57

B. Requirements
Section 101 of the Act states that “whoever invents or
discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”58 Thus, a patentable
invention must be a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition that is a new and useful improvement upon the prior
art.
Section 102 of the Act describes the novelty requirement.59 In
short, novelty means that the invention was not and could not have
been known by someone other than the inventor before the
inventor filed an application. The invention could have been
known if it was printed in any publication—including patent
applications—in any country.60
Novelty is determined according to the moment of invention.61
Another requirement of section 102 is utility, which contains three
separate requirements. First, the invention must be operable or
capable of use (general utility). Second, it must solve the problem
it is designed to solve (specific utility). Third, the invention must
have a minimal social benefit and not be merely harmful or
deleterious (beneficial utility).62
54

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000).
56
See id. §§ 1–13.
57
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307 (2000); infra Part
V.
58
35 U.S.C. § 101.
59
Id. § 102.
60
Id. § 102(a), (e).
61
See id. § 102(a); id. § 102(g) (referring to “prior art”).
62
See MERGES, supra note 52, at 189.
55
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Section 103 of the Act further provides that a patent may not be
granted if “the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious.”63 The subject matter must not be obvious to a person
skilled in the art.64 Nonobviousness may be a more difficult hurdle
to surmount for patentability than the utility and novelty
requirements because it demands that the invention comprise a
technical accomplishment. The technical step, moreover, must
have certain significance. It is beyond the scope of this article to
go into the particular degree of significance necessary65 especially
because this test is judge-made and highly abstract. An applicant
must show that the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in
the art. In determining nonobviousness, a court considers: a) the
scope and content of the prior art; b) the differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue; and c) the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art.66
Pursuant to section 101 of the Act, the invention must either be
a process, a machine, or a composition of matter.67 Section 100 of
the Act defines process as “process, art, or method, and includes a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material.”68 A process may be patented, even if the
resulting product cannot.69 A machine is defined as “every
mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and
devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or
63

35 U.S.C. § 103.
See Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(providing a list of factors relevant to the determination of the level of skill in the art,
including type of problems encountered in the art and prior art solutions to those
problems).
65
See generally MERGES, supra note 62, at 479.
66
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d
894, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Custom Accessories Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d
955, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1986); MERGES, supra note 62, at 479.
67
35 U.S.C. § 100.
68
Id. § 100(b); see generally Cohrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877) (describing
the process as a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. The
mode of treatment could be an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to
be transformed to a different state or thing.).
69
Eileen Morin, Of Mice and Men: The Ethics of Patenting Animals, 5 HEALTH L.J.
147, 153 (1997).
64

3-KOOPMAN FORMAT

2002]

12/12/02 3:19 PM

PATENTABILITY OF TRANSGENIC ANIMALS

121

result.”70 A manufacture is the production of articles from raw or
non-raw materials by giving them new forms, characteristics,
qualities, or combining them in a new fashion, regardless of
whether it is done by hand or by machine.71 A composition of
matter includes all compositions “of two or more substances
and . . . all composite articles, whether they be the result of
chemical union, or mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases,
fluids, powders, or solids.”72
To be patentable, an inventor must satisfy the enablement
requirement in section 112 of the Act. An invention is enabling if
the specifications and drawings of the claims enable any person
skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention without
undue experimentation.73
The purpose of the enablement
requirement is to facilitate the teachings of the patent so that they
may be repeated easily without wasting resources. Moreover, it
ensures that the inventor’s contribution is stable rather than
fortuitous.74
Section 154 describes the rights granted under an issued patent.
The patentee receives the “right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
U.S. . . . and, if the invention is a process . . . the right to exclude
others from using, offering for sale, or selling” products made by
the patented process.
C. Exclusions
The scope of patentable subject matter is broad, but limited.75
For example, laws of nature, principles, physical phenomena,
70

Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1853).
See, e.g., Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931).
72
Shell Development Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280–81 (D.D.C. 1957), aff’d,
252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
73
See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
74
See generally Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech Inc., 927 F.2d 1565,
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Timothy G. Hofmeyer, Comment, Everybody’s Got Something to
Hide Except Me and My Patented Monkey: Patentability of Cloned Organisms, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 971, 983 (1998).
75
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“Congress plainly contemplated
that the patent laws would be given wide scope . . . [but t]his is not to suggest that § 101
has no limits or that it embraces every discovery.”).
71
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abstract ideas, and products of nature are not patentable.76
Furthermore, human beings are not patentable, at least not on a
statutory basis.77 The processes and products of human cloning—
thus not including human beings—may be patentable. The federal
government does not fund the use of this technology, however.78
76
See, e.g., id. at 310 (finding that laws of nature, phenomena and abstract ideas held
not patentable); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972) (deciding that
mathematical algorithm is akin to mental process and unpatentable); Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (finding that only process that applied
phenomena to new and useful end patentable); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 127–28
(1854) (holding that electro-magnetism used for printing signs, characters or letters is not
patentable); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853) (stating that principle in abstract
is fundamental truth and unpatentable); Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F.
467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding that business method of bookkeeping was an abstract
idea and not patentable).
77
Pat. & Trademark Off. Notice: Animals-Patentability, reprinted in 1077 OFFICIAL
GAZETTE PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987) [hereinafter PTO Notice]. See also
Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearings Before the House Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, 100th Cong. 22 (1987)
(statement of Donald Quigg, Commissioner, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.). Several other
bills, containing provisions that would limit patentability of human-animal subject matter,
were introduced but never enacted. See H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 923, 105th
Cong. (1998); H.R. 2326, 106th Cong. (1999). Until now, human-related inventions
were not statutorily excluded from patentability. See Mark Jagels, Dr. Moreau Has Left
the Island: Dealing with Human-Animal Patents in the 21st Century, 23 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 115, 141–42 (2000).
78
In 1997, the U.S. government prohibited federal funding of the application of these
technologies on human beings and human materials. See Fact Sheet on Eight Years of
Peace, Progress and Prosperity, Pres. William J. Clinton, 2001 WL 20770, at *14
(documenting that President Clinton banned federal research on human cloning and asked
the scientific community to recognize a voluntary moratorium on human cloning); 143
CONG. REC. E607 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1997) (statement of Hon. Hamilton) (stating that
President Clinton ordered a moratorium on the use of federal funds for human cloning
and urging Congress to wait until a national bioethics commission reviews the legal and
ethical issues surrounding cloning before it passes a bill to ban human cloning outright);
NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS COMMITTEE 13 (1997); Alexandra
Hawkins, Protecting Human Dignity and Individuality: The Need for Uniformity in
International Cloning Legislation, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW 243, 274 (2001). The Bush
Administration has reconsidered this position and allows for federal funding of stem cell
research. See, e.g., Pres. George W. Bush, Stem Cell Science and the Preservation of Life,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, at D13; Jeremy Rifkin, Will Companies Hold Control of Life
Made in a Petri Dish?, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at B11; Sheryl Stolberg, The
President’s Decision: The Research; U.S. Acts Quickly to Put Stem Cell Policy in Effect,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, at A1; Editorial, Stem Cell Impasse, WASH. POST, July 12,
2001, at A26 (describing various views on the cloning issue before Bush made his
decision). There were several cloning bills proposed in Congress but not ultimately
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D. Patents for Transgenic Animals
1.

Historic Development

The “products of nature doctrine” and the “pre-emption theory”
(with respect to plant materials) excluded living matter from
patentability.
The products of nature doctrine precluded
patentability of materials existing in nature, including living
matter.79 Under this doctrine, one could secure patents for
fermentation processes and purified, naturally occurring chemical
or biological compounds, as well as patents for microorganisms as
a culture or in combination with a carrier.80 The product claims for
the microorganisms, however, were not patentable because they
comprised living material—microorganisms.
The PTO approached the patentability of plant and plant
materials as well as animals and animal materials in a way
analogous to judicial approaches to patents claiming living matter.
For example, the PTO rejected a patent application for altered
enacted. See, e.g., The Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1998). See
also Jennifer Cannon & Michelle Haas, The Human Cloning Prohibition Act: Did
Congress Go Too Far?, 35 HARV. J. LEGIS. 637, 638 (1998) (critiquing S. 1601 because
it “ignored important procedural safeguards, employed vague statutory language, and
created a bill with significantly adverse implications”). On July 31, 2001, the House
Judiciary Committee passed the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2505,
107th Cong., H.R. REP. NO. 172, at 1 (2001) [hereinafter HCPA]. The HCPA must still
pass the Senate and the President must sign it, and it does not necessarily determine PTO
policy regarding patentability of biotechnological processes and products. See Tol-OMatic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (reasoning that the PTO employs a broad definition of patentability and will
issue a patent if the invention is not frivolous or “injurious to the well-being, good policy,
or good morals of society”). This determination is related to the interpretation of the
“beneficial utility” requirement of the invention. See MERGES, supra note 52, at 189.
79
See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 115 (noting that courts have interpreted the
doctrine as an inquiry into “whether a naturally occurring product has been changed or
altered to the extent that the claimed form d[oes] not exist in nature”); Robert A.
Armitage, The Emerging U.S. Patent Law for the Protection of Biotechnology Research
Results, 1989 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 47. Cf. David Scalise & Daniel Nugent,
Patenting Living Matter in the European Community: Diriment of the Draft Directive, 16
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 990, 1028 n.176 (stating that the products of nature doctrine “denies
patentability of things already existing in nature”).
80
VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 114. See also Morin, supra note 69, at 147. Louis
Pasteur obtained a patent for a culture of yeast in 1873. U.S. Patent No. 141,072 (issued
May 9, 1873).

3-KOOPMAN FORMAT

124

12/12/02 3:19 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:103

plant material because the subject matter consisted of nothing more
than a combination of several products of nature.81 With respect to
animals, it rejected the patent application for shrimps in which the
head and the digestive organs were removed.82 Alterations that
were not considered sufficiently permanent were not patentable.83
The nonpatentability of plants was also related to the “pre-emption
theory” derived from the existing Plant Patent Act and the Plant
Variety Protection Act.84 The pre-emption theory precluded the
patentability of plant varieties, plants, and partial plant materials—
such as cells—when used to breed new plant varieties. Each act
protects particular plant varieties. The Plant Patent Act covers
asexually produced plants, including cultivated mutants and
hybrids. The Plant Variety Protection Act covers sexually
produced plants, including seed-bearing plants, but not fungi and
hybrids.85
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,86 the U.S. Supreme Court
narrowed the products of nature doctrine, thereby broadening the
definition of patentable subject matter under Section 101 of the
Act.87
Chakrabarty involved the patentability of altered
microorganisms (the bacterium from the genus Pseudemonas),
81
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129–30 (1948) (rejecting
an application for patent claiming mixture of bacterial strains which used to infect plant
roots, thereby contributing to the plant’s production of nitrogen).
82
See WADDEL A. BIGGARD, PROSECUTION OF U.S. BIOTECHNOLOGICAL RELATED
PATENT APPLICATIONS 17 (1985).
83
VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 115.
84
35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2000); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2000).
85
See generally GEERTRUI VAN OVERWALLE, PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL
INVENTIONS (1996) (discussing legal protection of plants and plant materials). MERGES,
supra note 62, at 157–70 (reviewing the various approaches to be taken to
(non)protection for plants and plant materials and noting that the preclusion of
patentability of plant varieties and related materials cannot be based on referenced acts or
their legislative history). Section 101 of the Act does not justify preclusion of
patentability. Moreover, preclusion does not derive from the International Union for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter
UPOV], because the U.S. made reservations to article 2(1) of that treaty. More
importantly, the UPOV is an executive agreement that has not been ratified by the Senate.
Section 101 of the Act seems to override it. The PTO however, has taken a somewhat
different stance possibly contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See MERGES, supra note 62, at 131.
86
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
87
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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which contained two plasmids that had been genetically modified
to provide a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway. The
invention provided for a bacterium capable of breaking down
multiple components of crude oil.88 The Court concluded that the
bacterium was human-made instead of a products of nature and
was, therefore, patentable as a manufacture or a composition of
matter.89 In reaching this decision, the Court determined that
Congress intended section 101 of the Act to encompass “anything
under the sun that is made by man.”90 Accordingly, the distinction
under section 101 of the Act is not between living and nonliving
materials, but between human-made and non-human-made
(natural) materials.91 The Court further reasoned that patent law
practice may protect inventions that Congress did not foresee at the
time the statute was enacted.92
Courts should be wary of excluding subject matter because
exclusion should be left to Congress.93 In Ex parte Hibberd,94 the
PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) further
expanded the definition of patentable subject matter under section
101 of the Act. Hibberd involved the patentability of plants and
plant materials—entire plants and tissue cultures of maize plant
cells with an increased content of the amino acid tryptophan. This
invention produced a high level of amino acids. The BPAI relied
on Chakrabarty to find that the Plant Patent Act and the Plant
Variety Protection Act do not narrow the scope of patentable
subject matter under section 101 of the Act.95 According to the

88

Chakrabarty, 407 U.S. at 305.
Id. at 307, 310.
90
Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)).
91
Id. at 313.
92
Id. at 313. But see id. at 314–17 (not directly responding to the argument that
Congress failed to foresee genetic technology when it enacted section 101).
93
Id. at 315–18 (adding that section 101 of the Act does not explicitly exclude
genetically modified organisms, whereas it has explicitly excluded other inventions such
as those useful only in the utilization of nuclear material).
94
227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (BPAI 1985).
95
Id. at 444 (reasoning that the pre-emption of the lex specialis and the lex generalis
applies only if the two are contradictory or irreconcilable); see also id. at 446
(determining that such was not the case here).
89
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BPAI, the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties
of Plants (UPOV) does not alter the scope of section 101, either.96
2. Patents Granted
In Ex parte Allen, the BPAI essentially accepted the
patentability of animal subject matter.97 Allen involved productby-process claims to hydrostatically altered Pacific polypoid
oysters, which grew larger than normal oysters.98 The examiner
rejected the application on the grounds that (a) the polypoid oysters
were living organisms and thereby fell outside the patent statute’s
scope, and (b) the oysters were obvious because they did not
sufficiently differ from those produced by other known means.99
The BPAI reversed the examiner’s determination that the oysters
fell outside the scope of section 101. It relied on Chakrabarty’s
holding that the Plant Patent Act encompasses human-made life
forms and, therefore, reasoned that the polypoid oysters were
nonnaturally occurring. The PTO has confirmed the Allen decision
with respect to the patentability of the oysters and stated that:
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers nonnaturally occurring nonhuman multicellular living
organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject
matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101 [sic] . . . . The
Board’s decision does not affect the principle and practise
that products found in nature will not be considered to be
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 and/or 102
[sic]. An article of manufacture or composition of matter
occurring in nature will not be considered patentable unless
given a new form, quality, properties, or combination not
present in the original article.100
96
Id. at 447. See also MERGES, supra note 52, at 157–70 (noting the preclusion of
patentability of plant varieties and related materials cannot be based on referenced acts
nor their legislative history).
97
2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (BPAI 1987), aff’d, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
98
Id. at 1426–27.
99
Id. at 1426.
100
PTO Notice, supra note 77, at 24 (explicitly excluding human beings from patentable
subject matter and stating that “[a] claim directed to or including within its scope a
human being will not be considered to be patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. [§]
101”). The PTO bars the issue of patents claiming human-based inventions because of its
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In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, animal rights groups
and farmers unsuccessfully challenged the PTO’s rule on both
procedural and substantive grounds.101 The plaintiffs argued that
the rule should have been published in the Federal Register
pursuant to section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and that the PTO should have invited the public for
comment. Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that the PTO had no
statutory authority to define the scope of patentable subject matter.
The plaintiffs sought a court declaration that animals are not
patentable subject matter. The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California rejected these assertions and held that the rule
was an interpretation of prior decisional precedent and, therefore,
not the result of substantive rulemaking. It was an interpretative
rule not subject to APA notice and comment requirements.102 The
Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal and determined that the animal
rights groups and farmers lacked standing.103 It, therefore, did not
address the substantive issue of whether transgenic animals should
be patentable.104
After issuing its rule, the PTO placed an eight-month
moratorium on further animal patents to allow Congress time to
interpretation of patent law and its reliance on the 13th Amendment of the Constitution.
Scholars and judges have criticized this approach. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990) (illustrating a patent on a human cell line); James P. Daniel, Of
Mice and ‘Manimal’: The Patent & Trademark Office’s Latest Stance Against Patent
Protection for Human-Based Inventions, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 116–18 (1999); Jagels,
supra note 77, at 136; Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal
Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 448 (1999).
101
710 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Morin, supra note 69, at 156–57.
102
Animal Legal Def. Fund., 701 F. Supp. at 731–32 (deciding that a PTO rule was
interpretive because it clarified prior cases such as Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1425, 1427 (BPAI 1987), aff’d, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and Ex parte Hibberd, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (BPAI 1985)).
103
The case first went up to the Ninth Circuit, who determined that the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 900 F.2d 195, 197
(9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that “[t]he complaint squarely raises the question of whether
the Patent Act allows the Commissioner to authorize the patenting of animals . . . [t]he
answer to this question turns on a construction of patent law” and arises under the patent
law). The case was then transferred to the Federal Circuit. Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
104
Elizabeth J. Hecht, Note: Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: The
Controversy Over Trangenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1060
(1992).
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debate the various issues involved in patenting animals.105 At the
end of the moratorium, the PTO issued the first patent claiming a
genetically modified animal, “the Harvard mouse.”106 Insofar as
relevant here, the claims read:
1. A transgenic non-human mammal all of whose germ
cells and somatic cells contain a recombinant activated
oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal, or an
ancestor of said mammal, at an embryonic stage . . . .
....
11. The mammal of claim 1, said mammal being a rodent.
12. The mammal of claim 11, said rodent being a mouse.107
The transgenic mice, intended for research, had an increased
susceptibility to breast cancer. The patent covers not only the
original transgenic mice, but also their progeny and any mammal
bearing the inserted oncogene sequence. The patent claims include
the animals containing the oncogene because the gene is expressed
in the phenotype of the animal.108 The use of this oncogene in
another mammal arguably constitutes patent infringement. The
scope of the patent is based partially on the reproductive capacity
of animals, thus ensuring “production of the invention,” one of the
patentee’s rights. On the other hand, its scope is also based on the
assumption that this invention applies to all mammals, including
human beings, which are excluded from the claim because of their
non-patentability as such.109

105

36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 888, at 271–72 (1988).
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988) [hereinafter “Harvard mouse
patent”].
107
Id.
108
The term phenotype refers to the visible or otherwise measurable physical and
biochemical characteristics of an organism resulting from the interaction of genotype and
environment. STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1071 (24th ed. 1982). The term
genotype refers to the precise genetic constitution of an organism. Id. at 581.
109
See J.H. STEK, OCTROOIRECHT EN TRANSGENE DIEREN [PATENT LAW AND
TRANSGENIC ANIMALS] 64–65 (1991); VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 355; Moga,
supra note 46, at 519; Morin, supra note 69, at 158–59.
106
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Since the Harvard mouse patent, the PTO has granted
numerous patents for transgenic animals.110 Most product patents
encompass only the genetically modified animals that carry the
particular feature in their genotype.111 The scope of these patents
is restricted to the animals that were used by the inventor, and thus
belonging to one race.112 Other patents have a broader scope,
110

It would fall outside the scope of this article to review all of the patents granted for
transgenic animals after issuance of the Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106. The
review is, therefore, limited.
111
Some of the illustrated patents also encompass processes, which, due to scope, are
omitted here.
112
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,156,952 (issued Dec. 5, 2000) claiming a “transgenic rat
whose genome contains at least one copy of a human immunodeficiency virus type 1 . . .
DNA . . . said rat develops at least one symptom of . . . AIDS”) (emphasis added) (partial
claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,981,830 (issued Nov. 9, 1999) (claiming a “transgenic mouse,
whose genome comprises a homozygous disruption of the endogenous hepsin
gene. . .said disruption results in said mouse exhibiting elevated blood serum alkaline
phosphatase levels . . . .”) (emphasis added) (partial claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,625,126
(issued Apr. 29, 1997) (claiming a “transgenic mouse containing in its genome a
transgene comprising in operable linkage a plurality of human V genes . . . in response to
antigenic stimulation”) (emphasis added) (partial claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,602,309
(issued Feb. 11, 1997) (claiming a “ transgenic mouse whose somatic and germ cells
contain and express a gene coding for mouse nerve growth factor, said mouse exhibiting
hyperinnervation when compared to a normal mouse, and said gene having been
introduced into fertilized mouse embryo”) (emphasis added) (partial claim); U.S. Patent
No. 5,591,669 (issued Jan. 7, 1997) (claiming a “ transgenic mouse having a phenotype
characterized by a disruption of the . . . endogenous heavy chain and an absence of
plasma B cells producing naturally occurring mouse antibodies”) (emphasis added)
(partial claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,434,340 (issued July 18, 1995) (claiming a “transgenic
mouse having a phenotype characterized by the substantial absence of mature T-cells
otherwise naturally occurring in said mouse . . . being incapable of mediating T-cell
maturation in said transgenic mouse”) (emphasis added) (partial claim); U.S. Patent No.
5,387,742 (issued Feb. 7, 1995) (claiming a “transgenic mouse whose cells contain a
DNA sequence, comprising . . . [a] nerve tissue specific promotor; and a DNA
sequence . . . wherein the promotor and DNA sequence. . . are operatively linked . . . and
integrated in the genome of the mouse and expressed”) (emphasis added) (partial claim);
U.S. Patent No. 5,183,949 (issued Feb. 2, 1993) (claiming an animal produced by “the
injection of human T-cells infected in vitro with HIV-1” leading to rabbit model for
testing anti-AIDS therapeutic agents, vaccines, and HIV-1 infection) (emphasis added)
(partial claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,175,385 (issued Dec. 29, 1992) (claiming a virus
resistant mouse, prepared by introduction of a gene encoding a human interferon having a
antiviral activity into a host mouse); U.S. Patent No. 5,175,385 (issued Dec. 29, 1992)
(claiming a virus resistant mouse, prepared by introduction of a gene encoding a human
interferon having a antiviral activity into a host mouse); U.S. Patent No. 5,175,383
(issued Dec. 29, 1992) (defining an animal containing a recombinant gene that is capable
of promoting as “benign prostatic hyperplasia or hypertrophy in said transgenic mouse”)
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however, encompassing not only the animals wherein the genetic
modification occurred, but also the animals’ offspring and/or
animals of different races and/or higher taxonomical units, such as
species. Broad patents were, among others, granted for:
•

transgenic mouse offspring produced by the mating of a
first transgenic mouse carrying a transresponder
transgene whose expression is regulated by a viral gene
product of HbV-1 and a second transgenic mouse
carrying a transactivator transgene;113

•

[a t]ransgenic mouse or the progeny thereof whose
somatic and germline cells contain a stably integrated
DNA sequence selected from the . . . rat AGP gene
which is expressed in the mouse to produce rat alpha-1acid glycoprotein;114
[a] transgenic non-human mammal whose genome
comprises DNA construct comprising. . .a rabbit WAP
promotor. . .said mammal expresses said DNA
sequence such that a recoverable amount of. . .protein is
produced in the milk of said mammal;115

•

•

a non-human mammal, a mouse in particular . . .
wherein the . . . Kir6.2 gene . . . essential for insulin
secretion . . .is lost . . . ;116 [and]

•

a transgenic rodent, comprising amyloid plaques in its
brain tissue . . . said rodent has at least 50% increase in
the number of amyloid plaques compared to . . . a
control rodent . . . .117

(emphasis added); U.S. Patent No. 5,175,384 (issued Dec. 29, 1992) (describing an
immune-deficient mouse “characterized by the substantial absence of mature T-cells
otherwise naturally occurring in said mouse) (emphasis added); Kluth, The Evolution of
Patents on Life: Transgenic Animals, Clones and Stem Cells, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 830, 833 (2001) (discussing the claims in the ‘383 and ‘384 patents).
113
U.S. Patent No. 5,221,778 (issued June 22, 1993) (emphasis added) (partial claim).
114
U.S. Patent No. 5,648,597 (issued July 15, 1997) (emphasis added) (partial claim).
115
U.S. Patent No. 5,965,788 (issued Oct. 12, 1999) (emphasis added) (partial claim).
116
U.S. Patent No. 6,194,634 (issued Feb. 27, 2001) (emphasis added) (partial claim).
117
U.S. Patent No. 6,172,277 (issued Jan. 9, 2001) (emphasis added) (partial claim).
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Most of the patents granted after 1988, however, have a more
limited scope than the patent granted in Harvard mouse.118 As
described, claim 1 of the Harvard mouse patent extends to all nonhuman mammals having the particular genetic feature—thereby
comprising the entire zoological class mammalia, except human
beings.119 Claims 11 and 12 of the patent encompass rodents
(order Rodentia) and mice (race).120 In general, one could
conclude that patents granted after 1988 chiefly encompass
particular animals (a variety of a particular race), and no longer
embrace entire (sub)classes or orders.121 Only a few patents
extend, or appear to extend, to higher taxonomical units such as

118

See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,191,342 (issued Feb. 20, 2001); U.S. Patent No.
6,187,993 (issued Feb. 13, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 6,166,289 (issued Dec. 26, 2000); U.S.
Patent No. 6,136,040 (issued Oct. 24, 2000); U.S. Patent No. 5,859,312 (issued Jan. 12,
1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,631,407 (issued May 20, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,663,482
(issued Sept. 2, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,661,016 (issued Aug. 26, 1997); U.S. Patent No.
5,550,316 (issued Aug. 27, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,530,179 (issued June 25, 1996);
supra note 112.
119
See HENDERSON’S DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGICAL TERMS 580 (9th ed. 1982); LYNN
MARGULIS & KARLENE V. SCHWARTZ, FIVE KINGDOMS: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE
PHYLA OF LIFE ON EARTH (1st ed. 1982). That insertion and expression of an oncogene is
a particular variety of mice has succeeded does not necessarily mean that this will also be
possible in other mammals. Whereas this process may be performed on the animals of
one race (mice) or the animals of a same species (rodents), such is likely not to be
performed, without further and possibly significant adaptation of the process, on animals
of other taxonomic (sub)orders. These animals differ largely in genotype. The manner of
expression of strange genetic material in an animal, and the extent to which it will
thereby contribute to development of certain characteristics—in case of the Harvard
mouse patent, development of certain cancers—depends on the entire biochemical
context of the animal concerned. The complete or incomplete transcription and
translation of a gene depends on its location on the chromosome and the manner in which
the functions of the codons are performed within the cells. Genes could, therefore,
operate in a variety of ways in different genetic contexts, e.g., in similar but genetically
differing animals. In view hereof, one should not lightly assume that the inventions
concerned can be performed in all animals of different zoological subclasses and orders.
Such may be problematic in view of the enablement requirement of section 112 of the
Act. See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 345–48; Hofmeyer, supra note 74, at 984.
120
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988).
121
See supra note 112.

3-KOOPMAN FORMAT

132

12/12/02 3:19 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:103

classes or orders.122 Some patents have been granted for the
modified animals themselves, as well as their natural offspring.123
This bears significance because, although the offspring will
reveal the particular genetic feature created by the invention, the
offspring does not derive alone from technology. In fact, the
offspring’s existence apparently results from a natural process and
is excluded from patentability under the “laws of nature” and/or
“products of nature” doctrines.124
Notwithstanding this broad construction of patent scope, there
has been a general narrowing in the scope of patentable subject
matter. This may stem from the increased level of skill of the
patent examiners. At the time the Harvard mouse patent was
issued, PTO examiners had relatively little skill in reviewing
applications for patents claiming animal biotechnological
inventions. Examiners relied heavily on information the applicants
provided, but they had an incentive to acquire the broadest patent
possible. The present examiners have more experience and,
therefore, better insight into the specifications, limitations, and
realistic applications of the inventions concerned.125
3. Issues Reviewed
a) Novelty and Nonobviousness
The patentability of genetically altered animals may be
problematic in view of the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements of sections 101, 102, and 103 of the Act. While most
of the referenced patented animals underwent minor changes and,
for the most part, pre-existed naturally, the patents granted for
them extended to the entire animal. In principle, this broad scope
derived from the characteristics of the inventions involved and the
122

See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text (including “nonhuman mammals”
and “rodents”).
123
See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text (including “transgenic mouse
offspring produced by the mating” and “their progeny”). The ‘597 patent, supra note
114, does not specify whether also naturally produced progeny is encompassed.
However, this may be suggested for the broad description of the particular claim.
124
See supra Part II.C.
125
Moga, supra note 46, at 521.
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environments in which they operated. Inventions such as insertion
and expression of genes cannot be separated from their entire
influence on the geno- and phenotype of the animal. After Allen
and the Harvard mouse patent, the PTO considered the entire
genome of the modified animals concerned different enough to be
“novel.” From a comparative standpoint, however, the genomes of
non-modified mice may not differ substantially from the genomes
of the transgenic one.126
The nonobviousness requirement may also impose a burden on
the patentability of transgenic animals. In 1995, Congress
amended this requirement to accommodate biotechnological
developments.127 As amended, section 103(b) provides that, under

126

See Hofmeyer, supra note 73, at 989–90. On this ground, the Trial Division of the
Canadian Federal Court denied the patent application for the “Harvard mouse” (Patent
App. No. 484,723, denied August 4, 1995). The Commissioner ruled that claims
covering a transgenic non-human mammal were not patentable subject matter under
Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. P-4, § 2 (2001) (Can.), but approved the issue of
patents covering the method and use claims. This decision is not published. See Morin,
supra note 69, at 147 n.3.
The Canadian Federal Court also denied the application insofar as it covered the
transgenic mice as such in President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Canada
(Commissioner of Patents), [1998] 3 F.C. 510, 525, rev’d, [2000] 4 F.C. 528 (Can.). See
id. paras. 23–24 (“A mouse is a complex life form and thus there are many features of the
mice which are not under the control of the inventors. They have created a method to
inject eggs with a myc gene but they have not invented the mouse. It is not necessary for
the inventor to directly control all aspects of the natural process leading to the creation of
the end product. . . . However, the ultimate product which will result from the process is
completely unknown and unknowable. . . . On even the broadest interpretation I cannot
find that a mouse is ‘raw material’ which was given new qualities from the inventor.
Certainly the presence of the myc gene is new, but the mouse is not new . . . . [T]here is
no way to separate the transgene from the rest of the mouse once it is introduced and
everything else about the mouse is present completely independently of human
intervention.”). Whereas the inseparability of the transgene and the animals may be
regarded a reason in the U.S. to grant patents, it is a reason not to grant them in Canada.
Clearly, the balance is struck differently in the U.S. and Canada. See Morin, supra note
69, at 197 (arguing that the Canadian Intellectual Property Office should follow the more
liberal U.S. approach). The review of the same application before the European Patent
Office (EPO) is discussed in Chapter III.
127
See 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000).
(1) [A] biotechnological process using or resulting in a composition of matter
that is novel under section 102 . . . and nonobvious under section (a) of this
section shall be considered nonobvious if—
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certain formalistic requirements: 1) a process may be classified as
nonobvious if the resulting or used composition of matter is novel
and nonobvious and 2) a composition of matter used in or
produced by a patented biotechnological process shall also be
covered by such patent. The first requirement fails to indicate the
nonobviousness of a process or shed any light on the standard for
novelty and nonobviousness of transgenic animals. The second
requirement specifies the general approach to product-by-processes
for biotechnological composition of matter.128 Furthermore, it
allows for the patenting of genes used in the application of
patented biotechnological processes.129
The amendment of section 103 of the Act eases the
patentability of biotechnological inventions, whether they are
processes or products. Amended section 103, however, does not

(A) claims to the process and composition of matter are contained in either
the same application for patent or in separate applications having the same
effective filing date; and
(B) the composition of matter, and the process at the time it was invented,
were owned by the same person . . . .
(2) A patent issued on a process under paragraph (1)—
(A) shall also contain the claims to the composition of matter used in or
made by that process . . . .
(3) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “biotechnological process” means(A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or
multi-celled organism to—
(i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence,
(ii) inhibit . . . or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide
sequence, or
(iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally
associated with said organism;
(B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific
protein, such as a monoclonal antibody; and
(C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by
subparagraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B).
Id. (emphasis added). See also VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 272–304; Walter, supra
note 46, at 1039–40.
128
Eight years before the amendment, in Allen, the BPAI held that if the product in a
product-by-process claim is the same as a product in the prior art, or is obvious in view
thereof, it could not be patented, even if the process was novel and nonobvious. Ex parte
Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1427 (BPAI 1987), aff’d, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
see also VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 305 (noting that the amendment removes a
restriction to patentability of said products).
129
In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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directly focus on the patentability of transgenic animals as such.130
In view of the PTO’s relatively low standard for novelty and
nonobviousness, as illustrated by the referenced animal patents, the
PTO will likely consider many similar processes to be nonobvious.
The product-by-process animals derived from these techniques
subsequently enable patentability of animals and other products.131
Because of these formalistic requirements, however, section 103’s
overall impact is quite modest.132
b) Products of Nature
The “products of nature” doctrine has a very restrictive
application, under which “anything under the sun that is made by
man” is considered patentable subject matter.133 Anything that
does not occur naturally without the interference of man, whether
almost insignificant or more influential, is considered to be “made
by man” according to the PTO and some courts.134 Even with this
restrictive interpretation of what constitutes a natural product,
however, one may doubt whether the broad scope of some of the
patents granted by the PTO for transgenic animals, which in
certain instances covers the offspring, is defensible.135 The
offspring cannot be considered to be products-by-process in the
130

See MERGES, supra note 62, at 602.
Many identical technologies (methods and processes) are used by biotechnologists in
an identical manner but on different subjects and biological materials. See Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721, 735–36 (1990). One may
doubt whether the animal may be regarded as the product-by-process. Clearly, the entire
animal (or most of it and its features) does not exist because of the isolated application of
the process—the insertion of the transgene. Cf. Joshua V. Funder, Rethinking Patents for
Plant Innovation, 21 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 551, 568 (1999) (“[A]s yet no human
is able to re-create a living organism from its constituent components . . . . [O]ur
inability to reproduce life suggests that claiming the whole organism . . . on the basis of
altering several biological processes may not yet be justified.”).
132
MERGES, supra note 62, at 602. For example, the product and process need to be
developed by the same firm or group.
133
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
134
Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426 (BPAI 1987), aff’d, 846 F.2d 77
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
135
See Funder, supra note 131, at 567–68; U.S. Patent No. 5,648,597 (issued July 15,
1997) (“progeny”); U.S. Patent No. 5,221,778 (issued June 22, 1993) (“offspring . . . by
mating”); U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988) (“ancestor”); Hofmeyer,
supra note 74, at 986.
131
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sense that the initial process, the insertion and expression of the
gene in the “original” animal, was not carried out on them by the
inventor. The offspring may be products-by-process if they have
been cloned. As the products of natural reproduction, most of the
offspring referred to in referenced animal patents cannot be
products-by-process, since the natural process of mating is
excluded from patentability under the “laws of nature” doctrine.
Consequently, the products of such a process can only be
patentable if they are novel and nonobvious manufactures or
compositions of matter that do not occur in nature absent active
human intervention. In view of the restrictive application of the
“products of nature” doctrine, one may also argue, however, that if
there was at least some human intervention in the natural process
(e.g., if that process occurred in vitro) a broad patent scope may be
justified.
c) Utility
Pursuant to section 101 of the Act, an invention must satisfy a
three-pronged test of utility. First, it must have general utility
(capable of use); second, specific utility (solve problem it was
made for); and, third, beneficial utility (not only harmful for
society).136 The general utility prong will usually not create any
problems for the biotechnological inventions concerned.
Transgenic animals are generally considered useful by medical
researchers, and most have some practical utility, thereby
satisfying the requisite level of general utility.137 Moreover, the
utility requirement does not require proof of the invention’s
usefulness; a general proposed use, which the inventors seemingly
always have in mind, suffices.138
Biotechnological inventions may not satisfy the second prong
of the test, however, due to their lack of specific utility. If the PTO
applied the utility requirement in a strict manner, many potential
biotechnological inventions may never be patented. For example,
the expression of an inserted gene is unpredictable and there is a
136

MERGES, supra note 62, at 189.
See Hofmeyer, supra note 74, at 987; Moga, supra note 46, at 525–42; Walter, supra
note 46, at 1038.
138
Walter, supra note 46, at 1038.
137
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substantial likelihood that it will not succeed. A skilled person in
the art may not be willing to accept certain in vivo tests as
predictive models of utility against development of particular
features.139 The same applies to the specific utility of transgenic
animals to be used as research models, i.e., to analyze the
development of a certain illness or to experiment with a medicinal
or other treatment, as was the purported utility of the Harvard
mouse.140 Strict interpretation of this prong of the utility
requirement may especially hamper smaller biotechnological
companies or less wealthy inventors who lack the financial means
to provide excessive clinical data to prove the specific utility of the
invention. Furthermore, because the invention is not yet patented,
these small companies cannot raise the funds necessary for more
extensive testing.141 Recently, however, the PTO and courts have
moved away from the traditional strict approach. Currently, the
PTO initially assumes that an invention, for which a patent
application is filed, has specific utility. The PTO has the initial
burden of challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility
in the disclosure.142 Only when the PTO provides evidence
showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably
doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the patent
applicant to provide additional evidence.143 In 1995, the PTO
issued special examiner guidelines for biotechnology
applications.144 These guidelines have undergone certain changes
and the PTO issued the most recent guidelines in January 2001.145
The guidelines state that if an applicant has asserted that an
139

See, e.g., Ex parte Aggerwal, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334, 1338 (BPAI 1992)
(“[T]here is considerable doubt that those skilled in the art would be willing to accept
appellants’ in vitro tests and in vivo tests as established models predictive of utility
against tumors in humans.”).
140
See supra note 38.
141
VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 338.
142
In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
143
In re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
144
60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995) (partially following the decisions in Marzocchi
and Bundy).
145
66 Fed. Reg. 4 (Jan. 5, 2001) (amending 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440 (Dec. 21, 1999),
corrected at 65 Fed. Reg. 3,425 (Jan. 21, 2000)). See also Julian David Forman, A
Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in Biotechnology Patent Applications, 12
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 647, 654–57 (2002) (finding the guidelines of Jan. 5, 2001 more
stringent than the previous guidelines).
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invention is useful for any particular purpose, and if this assertion
would be considered to be credible by the skilled person, the
examiner should not reject the patent because of lack of utility
(thereby combining the two prongs of general and specific utility).
The examiner assesses credibility from the perspective of one of
ordinary skill in the art in view of any evidence of record that is
relevant to the assertions. The PTO considers evidence of experts,
prior art, test results, and publications of all sorts. Data derived
from in vitro testing may support an applicant’s assertions towards
in vivo application.146
In view of the applicable utility
examination guideline, one may conclude that the special utility
prong of the utility requirement of section 101 of the Act will not
be a substantial hurdle for an applicant seeking a patent covering a
transgenic animal.
The third prong of the utility requirement of section 101 of the
Act, the beneficial utility requirement, may have a particular
meaning when discussing animal biotechnological inventions.
Courts have invoked this prong to deny patentability for immoral
subject matter, e.g., with respect to gambling devices.147
Beneficial utility has also barred patentability of inventions that
were only useful for immoral purposes.148 This utility requirement
may bar two types of inventions: inventions that are used to
deceive or commit fraud and those that are frowned upon by
society at large. In principle, biotechnological inventions are not

146

See supra note 144; In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (holding
that an invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or
sound morals of society; an invention that is mischievous or immoral, such as one to
poison people or to facilitate private assassination, is not useful).
148
See, e.g., Chi. Patent Corp. v. Genco, 124 F.2d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 1941) (granting
patent but distinguishing between game of pinball and gambling product whose sole use
is as gambling apparatus); Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1900)
(invalidating a patent for invention that produced artificial spots on domestic tobacco
because it was deceptive and lacked utility); Meyer v. Buckley Mfg. Co., 15 F. Supp.
640, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1936) (denying patent for vending machine that was a game of
chance); Nat’l Automatic Device Corp. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889)
(denying a patent for a toy horse course because product could be used as a gambling
device); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (denying a patent for return
device for coins for machines that were operated with coins because product could be
used as a gambling device).
147
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used to commit fraud or to deceive.149 Society may, however,
frown upon them.150
The present status of the third prong of the utility test,
beneficial utility, is not unequivocal. In 1977, the BPAI ended the
nonpatentability of gambling devices, and de facto prohibition,
based on lack of beneficial utility.151 The PTO and courts have not
unequivocally rejected the application of the beneficial utility
requirement as such. A U.S. District Court explicitly rejected the
doctrine in Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics Inc.152 The Whistler
court held that Congress should amend the patent law if it
preferred to bar patentability of radar detectors to evade speed limit
enforcement.153 Alternatively, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Tol-o-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft
may provide a basis for more frequent invocation of the doctrine
by the PTO and courts.154 It embraced the beneficial utility
doctrine, although it did not find it applicable to the case at
hand.155 If the PTO and courts were willing to apply the beneficial
utility requirement on a case-by-case basis, they could do so by
balancing the immoral uses of the inventions with the moral
ones.156 With respect to chimaeras, the PTO has announced that
149

However, in a stretch of the mind, one could imagine that genetic modifications
could lead to deceit on descent of animals and animal materials, e.g., for commercial
agricultural purposes.
150
Magnani, supra note 100, at 453–54.
151
Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (BPAI 1977).
152
14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
153
Id. at 1886.
154
945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the applicable standard of utility and
repeatedly referring to Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. at 1018).
155
Compare Tol-o-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1548 (finding a patent on a rodless pistol cylinder
not invalid for lack of beneficial utility), with Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 52
F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (not invoking beneficial utility). But see Magnani, supra note
100, at 453 (suggesting that the extensive reference to the doctrine shows that the Federal
Circuit is laying groundwork for future invocation of the doctrine).
156
E.g., In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178 (C.C.P.A. 1960). See also Robert P. Merges,
Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial
Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (1988) (suggesting that courts may be willing
to balance these features of a particular invention in determining utility). This approach
aligns with the “deontological theory” of ethics that provides for ethical rules to
determine under which circumstances certain actions may be taken. The deontological
approach provides for a balancing inquiry. Other theories are the “virtue theory” that
relies on absolute normative principles, and the “consequentalist theory” that focuses on
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inventions directed to human/non-human chimaeras may not be
patentable where they fail to meet the public policy and morality
aspects of the utility requirement.157 The PTO’s position supports
the invocation of the beneficial utility requirement with respect to
transgenic animals that contain human material. The basis for the
distinction between human/animal chimaeras and animal/animal
chimaeras is however, unclear.158
The definition of what
constitutes a “human” versus an “animal” is also unclear.159 Due
to the lack of clarity between what constitutes a human and an
animal and the generally restrictive application of the doctrine in
recent cases, one may doubt whether a rejection of a patent
application for lack of beneficial utility will stand on appeal.160
Legal scholars widely reject application of the beneficial utility
doctrine when discussing the patentability of transgenic animals.161
the consequences of acts and their (un)ethical nature. See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36,
at 70–72; Morin, supra note 69, at 168; Schrecker, Different Philosophies on the Ethics
of Patenting Higher Life Forms, 17:4 POL’Y OPTIONS 18, 19 (1996). Another theoretical
division is offered by Dr. Verhoogh in his research for The Institute of Theoretical
Biology of the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. See LINSKENS VERHOOGH, HET
MAAKBARE DIER EN TRANSGENE DIEREN [THE FABRICATED ANIMAL AND TRANSGENIC
ANIMALS] (1990). Verhoogh identifies four theories: (1) preference-ulitarism (all living
creatures are in principle of equal value, but fundamental interests of one should be
protected if this will only result in damage to non-fundamental interests of the other); (2)
two-factor egalitarianism (creatures with a higher and more complex psychological
capacity are of more value); (3) theory of law (all creatures are of equal value, but the
interests of one group may be sacrificed for the interests of another group); and (4) theory
of respect for nature (biocentrism, all creatures are of equal value). Clearly, the PTO and
Congress follow the two-factor egalitarianism theory. See generally W.J.M. Heijs &
C.J.H. Midden, Biotechnology, Attitudes and Influencing Factors: Summary Report 1
(1996) (reviewing the various ethical principles and approaches).
157
D.J. Quigg, Media Advisory Statement by Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
Patent and Trademark Office Issues, Statement on Patenting of Partial Human Life
Forms, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 17 (1988). But see Jasmine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of
Biotechnological Inventions in the U.S., Europe and Japan: How Much Patent Policy is
Public Policy, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 223, 242 (2002) (indicating that it would be
hard to refuse protection for human/animal chimaeras based on the PTO’s policy).
158
Daniel, supra note 100, at 119.
159
See Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195,
201 (1996); Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures
Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 477–80 (1989).
160
See Magnani, supra note 100, at 454–55.
161
See, e.g., Daniel, supra note 100, at 125 (arguing that the PTO is not suited to make
such determinations and that, if a “moral bar” should be raised, it must be done by
Congress); Hecht, supra note 104, at 1057 (arguing that the patent system is neutral and
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It appears as if the patentability of transgenic animals will not be
restricted significantly by the beneficial utility requirement. The
large number of patents issued by the PTO in recent years for
transgenic animals, including ones that carried one or more human
transgenes, supports this conclusion.162 Thus, one may conclude
that patentability of transgenic animals in the U.S. is based on
principles of the virtue theory.163 The absolute principles applied
encompass, for example, the principle that human beings are
distinct from animals, the principle that human beings are more
valuable than animals, and the principle that the rights of animals
are subordinate to the rights of humans.
d) Definitions of Species
As discussed above, the distinction between what constitutes
an animal and what constitutes a human being is unclear. This
distinction is critical because humans are not patentable subject
matter.164 The PTO’s recent statement that human/nonhuman
chimaeras may lack beneficial utility under section 101 of the Act
makes it clear that one must identify what is human and what is
not.165 Absent clear zoological classification, legal scholars have
is not suited to regulate the application of patented inventions; Congress could prohibit
explicitly, but has decided not do so, and the risks of transgenic research are speculative
and not direct and proven); Merges, supra note 156, at 1062–68 (noting that moral norms
change over time and have no clear limits, while recognizing the role of patent law as a
technological—not moral—stimulator); Walter, supra note 46, at 1045–46 (arguing that
it is inappropriate for the PTO to make far-reaching ethical decisions and that the possible
ethical problems relate to biotechnology and not to the patenting of such and its
products). But see VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36 (arguing that the patentee should have
certainty about the possibility of exploitation of the invention); Peter Drahos,
Biotechnology Patents, Markets and Morality, 21 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 441,
448 (1999) (arguing that the important societal consequences of certain inventions call
for a moral evaluation by patent offices of the inventions for which patents are sought).
162
See supra notes 111, 115–120; U.S. Patent No. 5,859,312 (issued Jan. 12, 1999)
(transgenic animal having human transgenes); U.S. Patent No. 5,814,318 (issued Sept.
29, 1998) (transgenic animal producing human antibodies); U.S. Patent No. 5,770,429
(issued June 23, 1998) (transgenic animal producing human antibodies); U.S. Patent No.
5, 625, 126 (issued Apr. 29, 1997) (transgenic animal producing human antibodies).
163
See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 70–72; Morin, supra note 69, at 168;
Schrecker, supra note 156, at 19, and accompanying text.
164
See supra note 77.
165
See Quigg, supra note 157. The need to phrase a concise definition is revealed by
the filing of a test patent application for “the product of the combination of human and
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suggested that species may be distinguished by their ability to
reason.166 The drawback to this approach, however, is it is difficult
to quantify reasoning ability.167
e) Enablement
Pursuant to section 112 of the Act, the patent applicant must
disclose his invention sufficiently to enable one skilled in the art to
make and use the invention without undue experimentation. If the
invention cannot adequately be disclosed in the specifications
(section 112) and/or drawing (section 113), it can be deposited
(section 114). Written and drawn disclosure can be problematic
with inventions of genetic modification because the magnitude of
an entire genomic region complicates one’s ability to describe the
effects of a genetically modified animal.168 For transgenic
animals, however, even deposit does not solve this problem.169
f) Third Party Interests
Various third parties may be affected by patents claiming
transgenic animals. First, agricultural farmers may be affected.
animal embryo cells to produce a single human/nonhuman chimera,” allegedly on
approximately a “50/50” basis. See Daniel, supra note 100, at 100–01; Jagels, supra note
77, at 116–17; Magnani, supra note 100, at 446.
166
See, e.g., Magnani, supra note 157, at 450.
167
See Fishman, supra note 159, at 478–80 (proposing a multi-prong test, based on
certain geno- and phenotypical characteristics and/or the origin of species without regard
to whether it was in vitro or in vivo); Ducor, supra note 159.
168
See Akim F. Czmus, Biotechnology Protection in Japan, the European Community
and the U.S., 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 435, 440 (1994); Hofmeyer, supra note 74, at
991.
169
The PTO permits patentees to deposit their inventions in places called depositaries.
While deposit may often be sufficient to meet enablement requirements, it may be
inappropriate for transgenic animals because deposit of an animal does not reveal the
operable invention in the genome. See Hofmeyer, supra note 74, at 993. Only deposit of
particular material of the animal could sufficiently disclose the invention, but may not
show the entire invention (both in geno- and phenotype). Joseph Straus, Ethische,
rechtliche und wirtschaftliche Probleme des Patent und Sortenschutzes für die
biotechnologische Tierzüchtung und Tierproduktion [The Ethical, Legal and Economic
Problems of Patent and Species Protection for Biotechnological Animal Breeding and
Animal Production] 39 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT,
INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INT’L] 913 (1990). See also VAN DE GRAAF, supra note
36, at 339–45 (describing the enablement requirement in the context of animal material
deposit).
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The “first sale doctrine” implies that patents cannot restrict postsale activities. The patentee’s right to limit sales ends when the
patented product is sold. It prevents purchasers down the
distribution chain from being charged with infringement that grows
out of a transaction further up the chain.170 The first sale doctrine
is not generally applicable to a patented transgenic animal. Due to
reproductive capacities, animals reproduce without interference of
the licensor or purchaser. Patents for these animals may
encompass animals of a certain race that have the particular feature
or explicitly encompasses all direct progeny.171 Transgenic
animals are especially attractive to farmers, due to their disease
resistant qualities or greater productive capacities.172 Farmers with
limited financial resources, however, may be disadvantaged by the
present scope of transgenic animal patents. Reproduction and use
of the acquired transgenic animal by such farmers will constitute
infringement. Compensation to the patentee may take the form of
damages after infringement has occurred or be added to the initial
acquisition price. Proposed legislation that would provide for a socalled farmer’s exemption has not been enacted by Congress.173 A
farmer’s exemption may not, however, be necessary.174 Note that
U.S. patent law does not provide for compulsory licenses.175
170

See Intel Corp. v. U.L.S.I. Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
See supra notes 112–113.
172
See infra Part C.1–3.
173
In 1989, two bills were introduced that considered the position of farmers. H.R.
1556, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 1557, 101st Cong. (1989). These bills were similar to
earlier attempts to create farmers’ exemptions. H.R. 4970, 100th Cong. (1988); H.R.
4971, 100th Cong. (1988) (permitting farmers to reproduce patented animals during
professional farming activities and allowing them to sell their offspring but prohibiting
them from alienating germ cells, sperm, or embryos). See Hecht, supra note 104, at
1063–67; Morin, supra note 69, at 191–92.
174
See Hecht, supra note 104, at 1073 (suggesting that patentees will not find it
economically necessary to enforce their rights to the full extent and collect royalties);
Walter, supra note 46, at 1041–42 (1998) (suggesting that the benefits of the transgenic
animals will lower costs for farmers drastically, even if the higher acquisition prices and
royalties are included and that inventors would, without patent protection, license out
their animals more selectively. This is based on the assumption that alternative legal
instruments, like the general law of contracts, will not provide enough protection to the
inventor. This assumption is reviewed and confirmed. CHRISTINE ENZING, OCTROOIERING
VAN GENETISCH GEMODIFICEERDE DIEREN: FEITEN EN MENINGEN [PATENTABILITY OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ANIMALS: FACTS AND OPINIONS] 21 (1991)). See also Eckehart
Von Pechmann, Ist der Ausschluss von Tierzüchtungen und Tierbehandlungsverfahren
171
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Second, the Federal Circuit’s denial of standing to animal
rights groups and farmers in Animal Defense may drastically limit
the possibilities for subjects, other than patentees, to negate the
scope and contents of an issued patent.176 It appears as if the
validity of a patent on a transgenic animal can be challenged by
patentees only, who are not likely to challenge their own patents.177
While anyone may request re-examination of a patent, he or she
can do so only on the basis of lack of novelty or
nonobviousness.178
Standards of patentability for transgenic animals may not be
affected directly by third party interests such as farmers and animal
rights groups. The present regime provides strong protection for
societal interest in innovation and the rights of patentees.
Moreover, opponents appear to have limited opportunities to
challenge that regime, at least procedurally.
III. EUROPEAN UNION
A. Legal Basis
The European patent system relies on the Convention on the
Grant of European Patents.179 The EPC aims to harmonise patent
law among member states of the EU. Inventors can file patent
applications in one state cognisable in all member states at the
European Patent Office (EPO). The EPO is authorized to examine
a patent application, reject it, or issue it. The patentee receives a
bundle of national rights. The EPC outlines procedural law while
vom Patentschutz Gerechtfertigt? [Is the Exclusion from Patentability of Animal Products
and Animal Therapeutic Methods Justified?] 36 GRUR INT’L 344 (1987); Straus, supra
note 169, at 929.
175
See MERGES, supra note 52, at 189.
176
See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
177
Hecht, supra note 104, at 1059–60 (including challenges on grounds other than
“inequitable conduct” (fraud) or “double patenting”). See also MERGES, supra note 62, at
751–95.
178
35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). This does not serve the interests of stakeholders, other than
patentees, either.
179
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, October 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199
[hereinafter EPC].
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national law determines the substance and scope of patents
granted. The EPC also includes important substantive provisions
that determine the contents and scope of the patents acquired to a
significant degree. Post-acquisition procedures are conducted in
the member states, but enforcement may vary considerably from
country to country. Before the conclusion of the EPC, various
member states had ratified the Treaty of Strasbourg.
The Treaty of Strasbourg attempted to unify substantial patent
law.180 This treaty had a profound influence on the formation of
the EPC,181 but because of the EPC, the Treaty of Strasbourg has
lost its relevance.182 Furthermore, the Union Patent Treaty has
been concluded, although it is not yet in force.183 The Dutch
Patent Act of 1995184 is particularly relevant because the EPC
provides for a collection of national patents, and national patent
law is thus important for the content and scope of a particular
patent. Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological
inventions (hereinafter the “Directive”) has a profound influence
on both the EPC and the national patent laws of the member
states.185 The Directive states that biotechnological inventions
must be protected by patent law and sets forth the conditions for
protection. Member states were supposed to amend their patent

180

Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for
Inventions, Nov. 27, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 47 [hereinafter Unification Convention].
181
It may be considered to be part of its legislative history and, therefore, important for
its interpretation.
182
WICHERS HOETH, supra note 53, at 9 (1993).
183
This treaty will be replaced by the Agreement on Union Patents (1989) as soon as
such is ratified by twelve member states. Id. at 9–10; Czmus, supra note 168, at 443–44.
184
Rijksoctrooiwet houdende regels met betrekking tot octrooien [ROW 1995] [Patent
Act Containing Rules With Respect To Patents 1995], Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51
(amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668) [hereinafter Dutch Patent Act].
Because of the scope of this article only a limited review of patent law of member states
is appropriate. The conflicting views between the Dutch legislature and the European
Commission on, e.g., the patentability of transgenic animals, is illustrative for the unclear
situation in which patentees may find themselves when they have obtained a national
patent under the EPC. For example, the Netherlands has tried to have European patent
regulations declared void by the European Court of Justice. See Jan J. Brinkhof, Patent
Litigation in Europe: Two Sides of the Picture, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 467 (2000) (discussing
the complexities of patent litigation in the EU). Another reason for the references to
particularly Dutch patent law is the Dutch legal education of the author of this article.
185
Council Directive 98/44/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13–21 [hereinafter Directive 98/44].
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laws accordingly by July 30, 2000.186 The Directive has been
incorporated into the EPC.187 The EPO has been examining patent
applications for biotechnological inventions in accordance with the
provisions of the Directive.
B. Requirements
EPC article 52(1) states that “[E]uropean patents shall be
granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial
application, which are new and which involve an inventive
step.”188 Thus, an invention must be novel, industrially applicable
and comprise an inventive step.
An invention changes what exists. An invention that embraces
a solution must be sufficiently novel and inventive. An invention
is novel if it is, in view of the prior art, not known to a person
skilled in the art.189 The state of the art does not include
applications that are filed later than the one involved, for the EPC
applies the first-to-file standard.190
It includes, however,
everything already public before the day of application. This
includes European and foreign patents and pending applications,
literature, and even oral communications.191 The Technical Board
186

Id. at 20–21. The patent acts of most member states are brought into compliance with
Directive 98/44. In the Netherlands, however, the proposed legislation is still processed
in the Houses of Parliament. On April 3, 2002, the Dutch Tweede Kamer der Staten
General (House of Representatives of the States General) voted against full
implementation of Directive 98/44. Handelingen Eerste en Tweede Kamer, at
www.overheid.nl.
187
See Implementing Regulations to the EPC, June 16, 2000, 1997/7 O.J. 437
(incorporating Directive 98/44) [hereinafter Implementing Regulations]. This will further
enhance harmonization of patent law in the EU and will increase the consistency of
national interpretation of national patents granted pursuant to the EPC with the
interpretations given thereto by the EPO. This incorporation occurred after the case law
discussed below was formed and will therefore not be included in the review thereof. In
view of the timing of the incorporation of Directive 98/44 in the EPC, its provisions will
be discussed separately.
188
See EPC, supra note 179, art. 52(1), 1065 U.N.T.S. at 271.
189
See id. art. 56,. at 273; Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [Dutch Supreme Court] [DSC],
Jan. 18, 1940, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie [NJ] 1940 (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR]
[highest court]).
190
See id. arts. 54(2)–(3), at 272.
191
See Case T 939/92, Agrevo/Triazole sulphonamides, 1996 E.P.O.R. 171, 178–79
(TBA 1996) (reasoning that state of the art “could reside solely in the relevant common
general knowledge, which again, may or may not be in writing, that is, in textbooks or the
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of Appeal of the EPO (TBA) applies a “problem and solution
approach” for measuring the inventive step and nonobviousness
requirement. The TBA identifies the closest prior art, assesses the
technical results of the invention in view of the prior art, defines
the technical problem that is to be solved by the invention, and
determines whether a person skilled in the art would have
suggested the claimed technical features for the solution
provided.192 Thus, it assumes that the person skilled in the art is
knowledgeable about publications and other common knowledge
around the world.193
The invention must have a technical character.194 The
technical character of an invention is different from its industrial
applicability. Subject matter that may be industrially applicable,
such as computer software, is excluded.195
The technical
contribution to the art may derive from the underlying problem and
the claimed invention as such, or in the means providing for the
solution of the underlying problem or the effects achieved
thereby.196 The industrial application of an invention relates to its
practical applicability. An invention must offer a concrete solution
for an existing problem.197

like, or be simply a part of the unwritten ‘mental furniture’ of the notional ‘person skilled
in the art’”); Case T 654/92, Sony/Interessengemeinschaft für Rundfunkschutzrechte
E.V., 1994 O.J. 1 (TBA 1994); Case T 534/88, BM/Ion etching, 1991 E.P.O.R. 18, 21
(TBA 1990) (including lecture in state of the art).
192
See, e.g., Case T 208/84, Computer related invention v. Vicom, 1987 O.J. 14 (TBA
1986) (requiring technical features to have a practical technical effect).
193
Case T 020/81, Shell, 1982 O.J. 217 (TBA 1982); see also Hague District Court
[DC] 41 BUREAU VOOR DE INDUSTRIËLE EIGENDOM [BIE] [NETHERLANDS INDUS. PROP.
OFF. ] 176 (1991).
194
Relaxin/Howard Florey institute, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 388 (Opp. Div. 1994); Rule 27
(1)(a) Implementing Regulations to the EPC. See also supra note 149.
195
See EPC, supra note 179, arts. 52(2), 53(b).
196
Case T 833/91, IBM/External interface simulation, 1998 E.P.O.R. 431, 437 (TBA
1993).
197
Cf. Case T 939/92, Agrevo/Triazole sulphonamides, 1996 E.P.O.R. 171, 180 (TBA
1995) (reasoning that “the notional ‘person skilled in the art’ is not assumed to seek to
perform a particular act without some concrete technical reason: he must, rather, be
assumed to act not out of idle curiosity but with some specific technical purpose in
mind”). See also Octrooi Raad [OR] [Dutch Patent Council], 188 BIE 21 (Sept. 30,
1987).
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The invention may be a product or a process.198 EPC article
64(2) states that a patented process encompasses products that
were directly acquired by application of the process. EPC article
83 prescribes enablement requirements. The invention must be
described in a manner such that an expert can take all the required
steps and repeat the invention. It is insufficient that it is likely that
the process, described in the specification to the claim, will lead to
the result described.199 Thus, EU patentability requirements are
generally similar to those in the U.S.200
C. Exclusions
1. Classification
The EPC contains specific classes of exclusions from
patentability. First, article 52(2) says that discoveries, scientific
and mathematical theories, aesthetic designs, business methods,
computer programs, and presentations of data are not inventions.
In view of article 51(1), they are not patentable.201 Second, article
53 states:
Patents shall not be granted in respect of:
(a) inventions whereof the publication or exploitation
would be contrary to ordre public or morality, provided
that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary
merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some
or all of the Contracting States;

198

See Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 (amended by statute on Dec. 14,
1995, Stb. 1995, 668); Directive 98/44, supra note 185; VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at
60.
199
See, e.g., Case T 226/85, Stable Bleaches/Unilever, 1988 O.J. E.P.O. 336 (TBA
1987); VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 325.
200
See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 427–41; Czmus, supra note 168, at 439
(discussing the novelty requirement); Darrell Dotson, Note, The European Controversy
Over Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 919, 925 (1997) (noting all
requirements of patentability).
201
The technical isolation of a gene, as such, without further modification, could be
regarded as a discovery. The EPO considers the isolated gene to be an invention. See
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 3(1), (2); Case T 292/85, Genentech I, 1989 O.J.
E.P.O. 275 (TBA 1988).
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(b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals; this
provision does not apply to microbiological processes or
the products thereof.
2. Article 53(a): Ordre Public and Morality
The EPO strictly excludes patentability of inventions that are
contrary to “ordre public” or morality.202 In Plant cells/Plant
Genetic Systems, the ordre public exclusion was analyzed
extensively by the TBA.203 In holding that “patent offices are at
the crossroads between science and public policy,” the TBA
rejected the suggestion that patent law is not suited for moral
considerations.204 It held that morality is concerned with the
difference between right and wrong. The totality of acceptable
norms, deeply rooted in European culture, is the basis for such
belief.205 Inventions must conform to that belief.206 The concept
of ordre public focuses on the protection of the physical integrity
of individuals as part of society, public security, and the
environment.207

202

Case 320/87, Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. 71 (TBA 1988). See also STEK, supra note 109, at
47; Straus, supra note 169, at 260.
203
Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. 545 (TBA 1995)
(discussing genetically transformed plant cells and plants). The exclusion of EPC art.
53(a) has also been discussed in detail with respect to transgenic animals, to be discussed
below. Plant Genetic Systems is one of the many cases that may be discussed while
reviewing EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(a). For the purpose of this article, such
discussion is limited.
204
See STEK, supra note 109, at 46; Schatz, supra note 47, at 2 (suggesting that patent
law is not aimed at moral considerations).
205
Various ethical theories determine what is “wrong” or “right.” See VAN DE GRAAF,
supra note 36, at 70–72; VERHOOGH, supra note 156 and accompanying text. Since
Europe is presently far from being one in a cultural sense, it may be doubted whether one
set of deeply rooted European norms exists, and if so, how to acknowledge them.
206
See Plant Genetic Systems, 1995 O.J. at 545 (Plant biotechnology is no more
“wrong” than traditional selective breeding. The inventions at hand were not excluded
from patentability on this ground.).
207
See id. (The inventions at hand were not posing a serious threat to the environment.
Appellants had submitted evidence that genetic engineering of plants as such could
threaten the environment. It was, however, not extraordinarily likely that the inventions at
hand would pose such a threat.).
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The EPO may consider public perception when deciding on
whether a particular invention violates article 53(a).208 In
Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Systems, the EPO’s Opposition
Division stated that public perception is particularly important
under EPC article 53(a) when determining whether there is a
general consensus that exploitation of a certain invention is
immoral.209 The last sentence of article 53(a) states that an
invention will not be considered contrary to ordre public or
morality simply because it is prohibited by national laws and
regulations of the member states. These laws and regulations
could, however, impose conditions on biotechnological research
and development.210 Article 53(a) gives a private right of action to
the citizens of member states.211
3. Article 53(b): Plant or Animal Varieties, or Essentially
Biological Processes, but Not Microbiological
Processes or the Products Thereof
a) Plant or Animal Varieties
The exclusion of plant and animal varieties derives from article
2 of the Treaty of Strasbourg, 212 which allowed member states to
ban patents on plant and animal varieties. With respect to the plant
varieties, many countries did not want to contravene213 the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants

208

Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Systems, 1993 IIC 24 (Opp. Div. 1992).
VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 66. It may, however, be complicated to determine
accurately whether such consensus exists. The subject-matter of inventions may be too
complex for many citizens in EU member states to comprehend. Also, the consensus
must not be within one member state, but within the entire EU. Finally, the manner of
reception of such consensus is unclear, e.g., by referenda, surveys, in the course of the
opposition procedure of the EPC, supra note 179, article 99, etc.
210
See, e.g., Gezonheids en Welzijnswet voor Dieren [Health and Welfare Law for
Animals], incorporated in the Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 (amended
by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668), art. 3b; Besluit Genetisch Gemodificeerde
Organismen [Decree Genetically Modified Organisms], Stb. 53 (1990).
211
See Dotson, supra note 200, at 926.
212
See supra notes 179–182 and accompanying text.
213
See Rudolph Teschemacher, The Practice of the European Patent Office Regarding
the Grant of Patents for Biotechnological Inventions, 19 IIC 18 (1988).
209

3-KOOPMAN FORMAT

2002]

12/12/02 3:19 PM

PATENTABILITY OF TRANSGENIC ANIMALS

151

(UPOV),214 which was signed less than two years earlier.
Originally, UPOV article 2(1) prohibited double protection of plant
varieties; consequently, many countries devised sui generis
protection.215 The UPOV ban on double protection was lifted via
an amendment on March 19, 1991. In EPC article 53(b), however,
the exclusion of plant varieties has survived several revisions.216
The EPO has interpreted the exclusion restrictively in cases
dealing with plant varieties, excluding plants only in the
genetically specified form of a particular variety.217
The reason for excluding animal races from patentability is
related to the controversy that arose during the preparatory
discussions for the Treaty of Strasbourg.218 The participating
countries fiercely debated the ethical implications, resulting in the
concerned signatories excluding animal races.219 Another reason
animal races were excluded was the dominating view at the time
that assumed that patent law was neither suited for, nor
appropriately directed at, animal races. The rationale included the
presupposed difficulties in disclosing the invention, the selfreplicating capabilities of animals that complicate determining the
content and scope of patents, and the lack of expertise on the part
of various patent offices and courts.220
214

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
In the Netherlands, sui generis protection for plant varieties was arranged in the form
of the Zaai en Plantgoed Wet [Sowing Seeds and Plants Statute], Stb. 455 (1966).
216
See also Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 4(1)(a).
217
See Case T 49/83, Propagating material/Ciba-Geigy, 1984 O.J. E.P.O. 112 A (TBA
1983); Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71 (TBA 1988); Case T
1054/96, Transgenic plant/Novartis, 1998 O.J. E.P.O. 511 (TBA 1997) [hereinafter
Novartis I], referred, Case G 1/98, Transgenic plant/Novartis, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111, para.
3.10 (Enlarged Bd. of App. 1999) [hereinafter Novartis II]. For the TBA’s motivation
regarding the referral, see 1998 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 193. As long as plant
varieties are encompassed by the claim, they are barred. See Case T 356/93, Plant
cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 (TBA 1995). The TBA affirmed this
substantive approach in Novartis. The Enlarged Board of Appeal in Novartis II
overruled, finally. The meaning of the exclusion of animal varieties, and its impact on
the patentability of transgenic animals, is discussed below.
218
See TESCHEMACHER, supra note 213, at 303–04.
219
See 1998 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 194; Straus, supra note 169, at 913; Von
Pechmann, supra note 174, at 344; Volker Vossius, Patentschutz für Tiere;
Krebsmaus/Harvard [Patent Protection for Animals; Onco-mouse/Harvard], 92 GRUR
INT’L 333 (1990).
220
See Straus, supra note 169.
215
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b) “Essentially Biological” Processes
Like the exclusion of plant and animal varieties, article 53(b)
exclusion of essentially biological processes from patentability
originates from article 2 of the Treaty of Strasbourg.221 At the time
of the Strasbourg Convention, essentially biological processes
referred only to the normal, or traditional, breeding activities of
plants and animals.222 It had been recognized that traditional,
natural processes are not worthy of patent protection. Further, they
could not meet the enablement requirement of EPC article 83 (i.e.,
it was hard to repeat the result and lacked technical character.)223
Biotechnological advancement has changed this situation. Now,
distinguishing an “essentially biological” process is more difficult
because of rec-DNA technology. Humans are able to change the
genetic material of plants and animals by manipulating the natural,
or essentially biological, processes.224
In view of these advances, the EPO has determined what
processes are essentially biological. In Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 225
the TBA held that whether a nonmicrobiological process is to be
considered essentially biological depends on the extent of human
intervention, the result achieved thereby, and the essence of the
invention.226 To render the process not essentially biological,
human intervention is not enough per se; such intervention has to
be more than trivial.227
In Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems,228 the TBA held a process
for producing plants, combined with a process for genetically
modifying them, to be essentially biological and, as such,
221

See supra notes 179–182, 210 and accompanying text. The exclusion of essentially
biological processes is reviewed here because of its indirect impact on the issues that are
at the heart of this article.
222
See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 103; Schatz, supra note 47, at 7; Straus, supra
note 169, at 922.
223
See WICHERS HOETH, supra note 53, at 30 (1993); Schatz, supra note 47, at 7.
224
See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 103; Volgens van Nispen, Octrooirecht en
Biotechnologie [Patent Law and Biotechnology], 1990 AGRARISCH RECHT [AGRARIAN
LAW] 165, 169.
225
Case T 320/87, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71 (TBA 1988).
226
Id. para. V(6).
227
Id.
228
Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 (TBA 1995).
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unpatentable pursuant to EPC article 53(b).229 The TBA concluded
that the transformative step was essentially technical, with a
decisive impact on the final result.230 The performance of this
step, and achievement of the result, was not possible without
human intervention.231 Thus, essentially biological processes are
those that occur entirely without human intervention. Also
considered essentially biological are processes that are influenced
by human interferences in a trivial manner.232
c) Microbiological Processes and Products
The last sentence of article 53(b) indicates that microbiological
processes and their direct products are distinguishable from
essentially biological products.233 This exemption derives from
article 2 of the Treaty of Strasbourg.234 The editing of this
provision was in line with the distinction that was made at the time
between macro- and microbiology.
At the time, the
macrobiological processes and products were not in anyway
considered to be technological, and thus were not within the
reaches of patent law. This was in contrast to microbiological
processes and their direct products, for which several patents had
been granted in the nineteenth century.235
The term “microorganism” does not have a taxonomic
meaning, but instead refers to the size of the organisms. For
example, pathogens were traditionally considered microorganisms.
“Microbiology” deals with the biology of microscopic forms of
life,236 or microorganisms. At present, biotechnologies and
microbiological methods are combined for the genetic engineering

229

Id. para. XI(40.1).
Id.
231
Id.
232
See Walter Moser, Exceptions to Patentability Under Article 53(b) European Patents
Convention, 28 IIC 848, 851 (1997).
233
See EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(b).
234
See supra notes 179–182 and accompanying text.
235
See Schatz, supra note 47, at 5; Joseph Straus, Biotechnologische Erfindungen—ihr
Schutz und seine Grenzen [Biotechnological Inventions—Their Protection and Its
Limitations], GRUR INT’L 256 (1992).
236
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 326 (Home & Office ed. 1995).
230
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of plants and animals.237 This raises the question whether a
process that is applied on both cellular and genetic levels can still
be regarded as “microbiological,” and, moreover, whether the
direct product thereof can also be considered to be
“microbiological” when it is an animal or plant.238
The TBA has determined that the term “microorganism” also
encompasses multicellular material, such as plants, animals,
plasmids, and viruses.239 Also, the term “microbiological process”
only refers to processes that are “typically” microbiological.
Products that are created or manipulated with the help of
microorganisms, by a process that is entirely microbiological, are
the products that “derive directly therefrom.” Hence, they are
patentable under EPC article 53(b).240
D. Patents for Transgenic Animals
1. Historic Development
Around 1900, German cattle breeders attempted to acquire
protection for the products they produced—the animals they
bred.241 Of course, their production methods comprised processes
of an essentially biological nature.242 In 1969, the first patent for a
bred animal was granted.243 The Bundesgerichtshof (German
Court of Appeals) ruled that a pigeon with red feathers could be
patented under the Patentgesetz (German Patent Act).244 Noting
that the breeders methodically controlled natural forces to achieve
a perceivable and causal result, the Bundesgerichtshof determined
237

See TESCHEMACHER, supra note 213, at 307; Moser, supra note 232, at 851.
See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 106.
239
Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545, para. 29
(TBA 1995).
240
See id.; VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 107; Moser, supra note 232, at 849.
241
See JOSEF KOHLER, HANDBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN PATENTRECHTS [HANDBOOK OF
GERMAN PATENT LAW] (reprint ed. 1984).
242
See id. It is obvious that essentially essentially biological processes created these
animals; they derived from veterinary selection and breeding as it has been performed for
thousands of years.
243
See Rote Taube [Red Pigeon], Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 52, 74 (75) (F.R.G.).
244
See id.
238
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that their method had a technical character. The invention,
however, was not repeatable and, therefore, not patentable.245
Later, the Treaty of Strasbourg and the EPC explicitly prohibited
patents on inventions like the red pigeon. In 1983, however, the
TBA held that there is no general prohibition on patenting
modified living subject matter, while explicitly referring to EPC
articles 52(1) and 53(b).246 This decision was confirmed in Hybrid
plants/Lubrizol.247
2. Patents Granted
In 1990, the EPO granted the first patent on a transgenic animal
under the EPC, the Onco-mouse.248 The initial application
contained the following claims:
1. A method for producing a transgenic non-human
mammalian animal having an increased probability of
developing neo-plasmas, said method comprising
introducing an activated oncogene sequence into a nonhuman mammalian animal at a stage no later than the 8-cell
stage . . . .
....
17. A transgenic non-human mammalian animal whose
germ cells and somatic cells contain an activated oncogene
sequence introduced into said animal, or an ancestor of said
animal, at a stage no later than the 8-cell stage.
18. An animal as claimed in claim 17, which is a rodent.249

245

See id. at 76.
See Case T 49/83, Propagating material/CIBA-GEIGY, 1984 O.J. E.P.O. 112 A,
para. III (TBA 1983).
247
Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71, para. IV(a) (TBA
1988).
248
Case T 19/90, Onco-mouse/Harvard, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (TBA 1990) [hereinafter
Onco-mouse/Harvard II], (commenting on European patent application 85.304.490.7).
The TBA considered the impact of this patent within the European Union and took the
unusual step of publishing the reasons for its decision. The application and procedure are
reviewed extensively here. Onco-mouse/Harvard II is the only fully litigated transgenic
animal patent under the EPC, and reveals its policy on patentability of transgenic
animals.
246
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a) The Examining Division in the First Instance
The Examining Division determined whether the applicant’s
invention might be considered novel and inventive within the
meaning of EPC articles 52(1) and 56.250 In light of the exclusion
of animal varieties of EPC article 53(b), the Examining Division
had to interpret the meaning of the term “animal variety.”251 It
rejected252 the TBA’s narrow interpretation of the term “plant
variety.”253 Animals can never be technical.254 The Examining
Division suggested that this determination is supported by the
different terms that are used in the applicable texts of the EPC.255
According to the Examining Division, the meaning of the terms
Tierarten, “animal varieties,” and races animales partially overlap,
and this justifies a broad interpretation.256 This broad definition
leads to the exclusion of all animals, since all animals belong to a
race and all races to a species.257 Furthermore, the Examining
Division stressed that animals could never be direct products of
microbiological processes—this would enable evasion of the
exclusion of animal varieties and is unacceptable.258 Thus, claims
17 and 18 were denied (with respect to non-human mammalian
animals and rodents) completely. The Examining Division also
denied the claim with respect to the “ancestors” noting that they

249

European Patent Application No. 85.304.490.7, reprinted in Onco-Mouse/Harvard
II,1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 para. I.
250
See Case V 4/89, Onco-mouse/Harvard, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. 451 (Examining Div.
1989) [hereinafter Onco-mouse/Harvard I], rev’d, Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J.
E.P.O. at 476. This discussion follows the exact order of the various procedural stages
and the EPO groups’ analysis and contents.
251
Onco-mouse/Harvard I, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. para. 7.1.
252
Id. para. 7.1.4. The restrictive interpretation was adopted in view of the existing sui
generis protection for plant varieties, and the UPOV prohibition of double protection. See
supra Part III.C.3(a).
253
Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71, para. IV(e) (TBA
1988).
254
See Onco-mouse/Harvard I, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. para. 7.1.4.
255
See id. Pursuant to EPC article 177, the convention is published in three equally
valid and applicable languages: German, French, and English (the official languages of
the EU).
256
Onco-mouse/Harvard I, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. para.7.1.4.
257
Id. para. 7.1.6.
258
Id.
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would result from natural reproduction, which is an essentially
biological process.259
The Examining Division did not consider the process to be
microbiological.260 It also did not deem it to be essentially
biological, for it involved micro-injection of genetic material into
the nucleus of the embryos.261 The process was, however,
considered unpatentable because of the enablement requirement of
EPC article 83.262 The Examining Division thought that the
genetic differences among all sorts of mammalians are too large to
have a reasonable expectation that the process can be repeated on
all of these.263 Thus, the process claims were also denied264—the
application was denied entirely.
Furthermore, the Examining Division determined that, in itself,
the claimed invention was not violating ordre public or
“morality.”265 It conducted a marginal review: inventions were to
be excluded from patentability only if they would lead to uproar,
disturbance of the public order, or criminal behavior.266 It simply
concluded that such is not the case with the invention at hand.267
The invention was considered to be beneficial to mankind.268 The
Examining Division justified its restrictive test of EPC article 53(a)
for precluding patentability on the ground that it did not consider
patent law the appropriate instrument for solving the problems that
may derive from genetic engineering.269

259

The Examining Division ignored the fact that the claims did not refer to reproductive
means. Thus, the descendants could also result from technological processes, such as
cloning..
260
The Examining Division’s reasons for this conclusion do not appear in the decision.
261
Onco-mouse/Harvard I, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. para. 7.2.1.
262
Id. para. 11.
263
Id. para. 11.2.
264
Id. para. 7.2.4.
265
Id. para. 10.1.
266
Id.
267
Id. para. 10.2
268
Id.
269
Id.
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b) The TBA in the Second Instance
On appeal, the TBA first considered the repeatability270 of the
invention.271 It determined that a specification to a claim does not
have to set forth the application of the process entirely if it
concentrates on a new field of technology.272 Only if the
repeatability is seriously doubted does EPC article 83 bar
patentability.273 It concluded that the specification enables a
person skilled in the art to repeat the processes involved in microinjection of genetic material and expression thereof.274 Harvard,
the patent applicant, asserted that the invention could be applied to
other mammals than mice, by the inclusion of the term “nonhuman mammalians” in the specification.275 The TBA did not
have any opposing evidence.276
The TBA considered the article 53(b) preclusion of animal
variety patents an exception to the general requirements criteria in
article 52(1).277 Therefore, it had to be interpreted restrictively.278
The legislative history of the Treaty of Strasbourg and the EPC
does not support the broad interpretation of the Examining
Division. According to the TBA, the inclusion of the terms
Tierarten, “animal varieties,” and races animales in the text of the
EPC supported a restrictive interpretation.279
The second
exclusion contained in EPC article 53(b) embraces animals as
such.280 The respective terms used in the different translations,
i.e., Tiere, “animals,” and animaux, have the same meaning. If
they did not have a different rationale and meaning, the drafters
would not have used different terminology for the exclusions.
270

See EPC, supra note 179, art. 83.
Onco-Mouse Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 3 (TBA 1990).
272
Id. para. 3.3.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id. para. 4.
278
Id. para. 4.5. This is in compliance with Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol,
1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71, para. V(5)–(6) (TBA 1988).
279
Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 4.6.
280
Id. para. 4.1 (excluding “essentially biological processes for the production of . . .
animals”).
271
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The TBA held that the EPO has to find a compromise between
an inventor’s need to receive appropriate protection for his
invention and the public’s interest that certain categories of
animals be excluded from patentability.281
Before such a
compromise can be found, one first needed to ascertain the exact
meanings of the terms Tierarten, “animals,” and animaux.282 If the
mice did not fall within the scope of these terms, their patentability
was not barred by article 53(b).283 If the mice did fall within the
scope of one of these terms, the correctness of such term was to be
reviewed through comparison with the other two terms.284
The TBA agreed with the Examining Division with respect to
the non-essentially biological nature of the process of microinjection,285 but it did not agree that the “ancestors” produced
through natural reproduction were excluded from patentability.286
It concluded that this exclusion for processes had been applied
incorrectly to the Onco-mouse.287 Claim 17 applied to productsby-process, the ancestors, that remain products for the purpose of
patentability.288 Also, it found that if the parents were not
excluded from patentability—to be determined under article
53(b)—then the ancestors were also not to be excluded, for they
were genetically identical.289
The final sentence of EPC article 53(b) contains an exception
to the exclusion from patentability of that provision.290 The
general requirements for patentability are fully applicable to
microbiological processes and their direct products, contrary to the
decision of the Examining Division in this regard.291 The direct
products of microbiological processes were held to be patentable,
even if they were animals.292 Thus, it was necessary to determine
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292

Id. para. 4.5.
Id. para. 4.6.
Id. para. 4.8.
Id.
Id. para. 4.9.1.
Id. para. 4.9.2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 5.
Id.
Id.
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whether the process at hand was a microbiological one, and if so,
whether the animals derived directly from it.
The TBA held that a full test to the article 53(a) exclusion of
patentability was necessary, especially for applications that
embrace genetic engineering inventions.293 Genetically modifying
animals by inserting oncogenes may be problematic in view of the
ordre public.294 First, it may cause animal suffering.295 Second,
eventual release of the animals would have unlimited and
irreparable consequences.296 In determining a patent application,
the EPO needed to balance the interests in preventing animal
suffering, environmental protection, and humankind’s need for
curing genetic diseases.297 Consequently, the TBA remanded the
case to the Examining Division.298
c) The Examining Division in the Third Instance
On remand, the Examining Division concluded that the
meaning of EPC article 53(b) is unclear in light of the different
terms its translations contain (Tierarten, “animal varieties,” and
races animaux).299 Claims 17 and 18 of the application focused on
non-human mammals, such as rodents, and particularly mice. The
Examining Division subsequently defined “animal variety” as:
[R]odents or even mammals constitute a taxonomic unit
much higher than species. An “animal variety” or “race
animale” is a sub-unit of species and therefore of even
lower ranking than a species. Accordingly, the subject

293

Id.
Id.
295
Id.
296
Id. These considerations relate to oppositions that were conducted pursuant to EPC,
supra note 179, article 99. Some of the filed oppositions are discussed in Morin, supra
note 69, at 159–60.
297
Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 5.
298
Id. Pursuant to EPC, supra note 179, article 111(1), the TBA could have decided the
case itself or, as it did, remand to the Examining Division. It remanded because the
review in this case was important, deserving two instances.
299
Case V 6/92, Onco-mouse/Harvard, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para. 2 (Examining Div.
1992) [hereinafter Onco-mouse/Harvard III].
294
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matter of the claims to animals per se is considered not to
be covered by the . . . terms of article 53(b) EPC.300
Hence, with respect to the animals, the application was not rejected
under EPC article 53(b).301
Furthermore, the Examining Division held that genetic
engineering inventions as such do not violate ordre public or
morality, and, therefore, do not need to be excluded from
patentability per se pursuant to EPC article 53(a).302 It determined
that:
(i) A patent does not give the patentee a right to
exploitation, but the right to exclude others from exploiting
the invention for a certain period of time;303
(ii) [t]he principle is patentability; exclusions therefrom
need to be interpreted restrictively;304
(iii) [n]ew technologies always bring new risks; the risks
need to be reviewed in view of the benefits those
technologies; after such review the determination about
patentability can be made;305
(iv) [i]f inventions concern higher forms of life, the
possible sufferance of these forms because of the invention
needs to be considered in aforementioned review;306 [and]
(v) [t]his review needs to be made with respect to every
invention, on a case-by-case basis.307
Subsequently, the Examining Division balanced the interests
mentioned by the TBA.308 It concluded that the invention at hand
300

Id. Thus, the claims do not focus on Tierarten, “animal varieties,” and races
animaux. In fact, the Examining Division conducted a zoological classification. To be
able to do so, however, it must have had defined them.
301
Id. para. 4(v).
302
Id.
303
Id. para. 3.
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
Id.
308
Id. para. 4.
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did not violate the ordre public or morality309 for the following
reasons:
(i) The invention is beneficial to human beings; cancer is a
disease that has numerous victims, and every new means in
the battle against this disease should be welcomed;310
(ii) [a]nimal suffering will decrease because of this
invention; a smaller number of animal models will be
needed than in conventional research;311
(iii) [t]here are no alternatives to animal models for cancer
research;312
(iv) [i]n view of the need for environmental protection, the
purpose and use of the invention needs to be considered;
the animal models that are produced by the invention are to
be used in laboratories by skilled personnel; the chance that
the animals may end up in free nature is small, and would
only increase by a mistake—and the risk of a mistake
cannot in itself support denial of the application at hand;313
[and]
(v) [t]he fact that a certain technology may create risks does
not render it a violation of ordre public or morality; the
exploitation of such technologies must be regulated by
governmental bodies other than the EPO.314
As a result, it granted the patent.315
3. The European Case Law Reviewed
Clearly, transgenic animals can fulfill the requirements of EPC
articles 52(1) and 56. They can be novel, inventive, and have
industrial application.316 Genetically modified animals can have a
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316

Id.
Id. para. 4(i).
Id. para. 4(ii).
Id. para. 4(iii).
Id. para. 4(iv).
Id. para. 4(v).
Id.
See generally id.
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technical character, so long as they do not derive from essentially
biological processes.317 Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems shows
that as long as the same result could not have been achieved
without human intervention, and the difference from the result
without such intervention is not trivial, they are not so produced.318
In case the applied method of genetic modification can be
considered to be microbiological, the animals that directly derive
therefrom are patentable.319 This is so, regardless of whether the
animal would be a Tierart, “animal variety” or race animaux.320
In view of Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, it may be
doubted whether the process of genetically modifying an animal
(such as micro-injection in the case of the Onco-mouse) can be
regarded as microbiological. In Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems,
the TBA held that only processes that are typically microbiological
would be included.321 It may be argued that the biotechnological
process is of decisive importance to the final result—the transgenic
animal with the particular feature. Furthermore, and contrary to
the determination of the TBA in Onco-mouse/Harvard, it has been
held that entire multicellular organisms cannot derive from
microbiological processes.322
The zoological classification that the Examination Division
made in Onco-mouse/Harvard III is not entirely correct. The
317

See Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71, paras. 4–6 (TBA
1988); Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 (TBA
1995).
318
Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. para. 18.7.
319
Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 4.9.2 (TBA
1990).
320
The EPO uses both the terms races animaux and “races animals.” Its terminology is
followed where the applicable holdings are relevant. The correct term is races animales.
321
Plant genetc systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. para. 17.1–13.
322
See id. The TBA held that the modified cells could directly derive from the
microbiological process, not the entire plant. But see Novartis, Case T 1054/96, 1998 O.J.
E.P.O. 511, paras. 48–50 (TBA 1997) (requiring a conceptual approach—the question is
whether the modified organism is still related to the microbiological process, or comes
closer to a “variety”). Arguably, this approach cannot stand. Article 53(b) is clear on the
inclusion of products that derive directly from microbiological processes: they are
patentable. A conceptual approach does not seem reconcilable with this provision
whereas a technical approach, see, e.g., Plant Genetic Systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. para.
17.1–13, seems to be. Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. para. 4, seems to confirm this with
respect to EPC articles 53(b) and 64(2).
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Examination Division considers Tierarten (species) to be of a
higher taxonomical unit than the “animal varieties” and races
animaux, whereas the latter are considered as of the same
taxonomical unit.323
“Varieties” and “races,” however, do not have to be of the
same taxonomical unit.324
Depending upon the particular
circumstances, the term “variety” may relate to a higher or lower
taxonomical unit than “races.”325 The term “variety” means
“deviation from type or species”.326 Thus, “varieties” could be
deviations from a species, from a race, or from a specific variety
within the same species or race.327 In line with the holding of the
TBA, it should be determined whether an invention falls within the
scope of any of the terms used in the respective texts of EPC
article 53(b). Thus, the invention may resemble a “race,” a
“variety” of a “race,” an Arte, a “variety” of an Arte and,
obviously, a “variety” of a “variety” of a “race” or Arte. If any of
the terms apply, it should be determined whether they have the
correct meaning.328 In the case of transgenic animals, the
invention will mostly be a “variety” of a particular race—it
concerns minor genetic changes that will not easily result in a new
“race.”329 Within the near future, however, biotechnologists may
create new races.
Certain chimaeras may be genetically
distinguishable from the races that have provided their genetic
parts—they may not be classifiable in one or the other racial
category.330
Onco-mouse/Harvard permits the issuance of broad patents.
The application must focus on taxonomical units higher than
Tierarten, whereas the specification only has to instruct the
successive steps to be performed in modifying one type of animal
323

Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para. 2 (Examining
Div. 1992).
324
Id.
325
Id.
326
HENDERSON’S DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGICAL TERMS, supra note 1, at 578.
327
On the zoological classification of animals (including human beings), see MARGULIS
& SCHWARTZ, supra note 119.
328
Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 4.8 (TBA 1990).
329
See Schatz, supra note 47, at 10.
330
See Vossius, supra note 219, at 334.
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of one race.331 To protect the patentability of his other invention
from being barred by article 53(b) exclusion, the inventor just has
to avoid addressing his or her claim to a particular animal (of a
particular race). The EPO will only reject if there is serious doubt
about the applicant’s assertions in the specification. The TBA
seems to assume that all processes of genetic modification will, in
principle, be performable with all animals, and that such
performance will be successful as well.332 The enablement
requirement of EPC article 83 is hereby weakened. Thus, in view
of Onco-mouse/Harvard, inventors can quite easily obtain broad
patents for minimal description (and perhaps minimal invention)
with respect to transgenic animals under the EPC.333
In view of EPC article 53(a), it is clear that the EPO applies
ethical principles to the patentability of transgenic animals
according to the deontological and consequentialist theories.334
The TBA has provided for a balancing test between the purposes
and consequences of the invention.335 The EPO needs to review
the purposes of the invention in light of their benefits and their
consequences, such as animal suffering and the effects on the
environment.336 Applicants may, however, have to pass difficult
hurdles before their claims are awarded, in view of the opposition
procedure that is provided in EPC article 99. The TBA has taken
opposition seriously and considers it in its deliberations.337
4. Directive 98/44338
Directive 98/44 article 1 requires that member states of the EU
protect biotechnological inventions through their patent laws. This
331

Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para. 2 (Examining
Div. 1992); Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 para. III (Enlarged Bd. of
App. 1999).
332
Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 3.3, .8.
333
See Dotson, supra note 200, at 933; Funder, supra note 131, at 557.
334
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
335
Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 5 (applied by the Examining
Division in Onco-mouse/Harvard III, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. at 589).
336
Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 5; VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at
70–72.
337
See Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 4.9.2; Dotson, supra note 200, at
926.
338
See supra note 185.
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follows the case law of the EPO.339 Directive 98/44 article 2
defines the terms “biological material” and “microbiological
process.” Article 2(1)(a) states that “biological material” means
any material containing genetic information and capable of
reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological system. This
definition clearly encompasses animals. Article (2)(1)(b) states
that a microbiological process is any process involving, or
performed upon, or resulting in microbiological material. Article
2(2) states that a process for the production of plants and animals is
essentially biological if it consists entirely of natural phenomena,
such as crossing and selection. Article 2(3) states that an effective
EC Regulation defines the term “plant variety.”340 “Animal
variety” is not defined. Article 3(1) determines that inventions that
fulfill the general requirements of patent law are patentable, even if
they concern biological material. Article 3(2) states that biological
material which is isolated from its natural environment or
produced through a technical process can be the subject of an
invention, even if it occurred previously in nature. This provision
permits the patenting of not only genes that are isolated from the
genome, but also of plasmids, viruses, and entire animals—if they
can be produced through a technical process.341
Article 4 provides that:
1. The following shall not be patentable:
(a) plant and animal varieties;
(b) essentially biological processes for the production
of plants or animals.

339

See, e.g., Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 paras. 48–50 (Enlarged Bd.
of App. 1999); Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545
(TBA 1995); Onco-Mouse Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 4.9.2 (TBA 1990); Case T
320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71 (TBA 1988).
340
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 2(3).
341
In Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. at 545, the TBA doubted whether this
could be achieved though a biotechnological process as such. Regarding the first part of
the provision, an animal that has been isolated from its natural surrounding (caught by a
technical catching technique containing an added biotechnological element) can be
patented, arguably, as a product-by-process.
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2. Inventions, which concern plants or animals, shall be
patentable if the technical feasibility of invention is not
confined to a particular plant or animal variety
3. Paragraph 1(b) shall be without prejudice to the
patentability of inventions which concern a microbiological
process or other technical process or product obtained by
means of such process.342
Article 4(1)(a) and (b) follow EPC article 53(b) and the preexisting case law.343 It should be noted, however, that the term
“essential biological processes” has a more restrictive meaning
under Directive 98/44 than it had under the pre-existing case law.
Directive 98/44 article 2(2) provides that they are processes that
are comprised entirely of natural phenomena, such as crossing and
selection. The case law shows that essentially biological processes
are those that occur without a “decisive” human intervention.344
Directive 98/44 deviates therefrom in the sense that all processes
that are not entirely biological are not essentially biological. The
EPO may consider animals produced by sexual reproduction, but
with slight human interference, to be derived from other
processes—and as such patentable.
Article 4(2) also follows the case law of the EPO, and makes
clear that varieties as such are excluded from patentability.345 The
terms in the effective text of Directive 98/44 are Tierrassen, races
animals, and “animal varieties.”346 Applications for inventions
342

Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 3(2).
See Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. paras. 48–50; Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J.
E.P.O. at 545; Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476.
344
Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. para. 17.1.
345
See Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. paras. 48–50; Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J.
E.P.O. at 545; Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476.
346
See Von Pechmann, supra note 174, at 347 (arguing that most applications will focus
on a lower taxonomical level than species, and, therefore, the exclusion would function
only if it was directed at those lower levels and that this would serve consistency).
Vossius, supra note 219, at 337, argued, conversely, that the terms “animal varieties” and
races animaux should be replaced by the terms “animal species” and espèces animales
(arguing that since inventions are not likely to encompass species, the exclusion should
be directed to it). The English equivalent of the terms races animales and Tierrassen
would have been “animal races.” Because of inclusion of the term “animal variety,”
varieties as such cannot be patented, and also confusion may remain on the particular
meaning of the exclusion in a particular case.
343
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that are directed at taxonomical units higher than those of races
and (racial) varieties will not be barred by the exclusion that is
provided for by article 4(1)(a), its implementation in national
patent law, or EPC article 53(b). Since Directive 98/44 does not
refer to enablement requirements, such as are included in EPC
article 83, it is likely that the light standard of the TBA will be
applied by the EPO, and that inventors can acquire broad animal
patents with less description.347
Article 4(3) follows the case law with respect to the productsby-process patents for animals, akin to the ones that are provided
for in the last sentence of EPC articles 53(b) and in EPC article
64(2).348 It seems to broaden, however, the scope of the products
that are derived by the processes. The term “direct,” as it appears
in EPC articles 53(b) and 64(2), is omitted; the products may be
produced “by means” of a microbiological or other technical
process.
Furthermore, and in view of the definition of
microbiological processes in article 2(1)(b), it is likely that the
EPO considers methods of genetic modification to be
microbiological.349 The reasoning of the Examining Division in
Onco-mouse/Harvard shows that these products can be produced
“by means” of such processes.350
347

See Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476. Note that national courts are
competent under national law with respect to the enforcement of the patent, including
validity procedures, etc. Absent any reference to the enablement requirement in
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, the national courts will set their own standards, not
necessarily the same as that of the TBA. For example, in the Netherlands, the
enablement requirement of the Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 (amended
by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668), article 25 is applied rather strictly. See
WICHERS HOETH, supra note 53, at 28.
348
See Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. at 111; Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O.
at 476. As described, it may not be difficult to directly produce an animal through a
process that is not an essentially biological one. See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art.
2(2).
349
See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 2(1)(b). The clause states that
microbiological processes are processes that involve, or are performed upon, or result in
microbiological material. Pursuant to this definition, methods of genetic modification,
such as were used in Onco-mouse/Harvard, will be considered microbiological.
350
Consequently, the decision in Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, Case T 356/93, 1995
O.J. E.P.O. 545 (TBA 1995), that entire animals can never derive directly from a
microbiological process: only the genetically modified cells, looses its importance. The
animals do not need to derive directly from the process, but must be produced by means
thereof.
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Directive 98/44 article 5(1) dictates that the human body, at the
various stages of its development, and the discovery of one of its
elements, including the sequence of a gene, are not patentable. An
element isolated from a human body or otherwise produced by
technical means may constitute a patentable invention pursuant to
clause 2 of this provision. Further, article 6 states that:
1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their
commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public
or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed so
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or
regulation.
2. On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular,
shall be considered unpatentable:
(a) processes for cloning human beings;
(b) processes for modifying the germ line identity of
human beings;
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial
purposes;
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of
animals that are likely to cause them suffering without
any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and
also animals resulting from such processes.351
Article 6(1) deviates from EPC article 53(a); it is narrower. Only
commercial exploitation can be contrary to ordre public or
morality. EPC article 53(a) provides for inventions of which the
publication or exploitation is contrary to ordre public or morality.
The patentability of human beings, their parts, and material is
excluded in a broad manner. The exclusion of processes for
genetic modification of animals, and the animals resulting
therefrom, by article 6(2)(d) is in line with the balancing test as
outlined in Onco-mouse/Harvard.352
351

Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 6.
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, article 6(2)(d) provides for a combination of the
deontological and consequentialist theories. However, in view of considerations 40–43
and article 6(2)(a)–(c), it is noted that Directive 98/44 makes a hard distinction between
352

3-KOOPMAN FORMAT

170

12/12/02 3:19 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:103

Article 7 provides that the European Group on Ethics in
Science and New Technologies (Group) evaluates all aspects of
biotechnology. This provision reveals the European inclination to
actively focus on ethical considerations with respect to the
patentability of transgenic animals. Since the Group will function
outside of the patenting process, its reports are likely to have
interpretative value for national courts and the EPO. It is likely,
therefore, that the Group will play a role in future proceedings
under EPC article 99 (the opposition procedure).353
Directive 98/44 articles 8 to 11 state the content and scope of
patents granted for biotechnological inventions. Article 8(1) sets
forth that the protection conferred by a patent on biological
material possessing certain characteristics as a result of the
invention shall extend to any biological material derived from that
biological material through propagation or multiplication in an
identical or divergent form and possessing those same
characteristics. Clause 2 of this provision states that patents
granted for processes of genetic modification extend to the
products directly obtained thereby, and to material obtained
through propagation or multiplication derived from these products.
These provisions confirm the determination of the TBA toward
patentability of the descendants of the genetically modified
mice.354 They also confirm the case law with respect to the scope
of patents for microbiological and other processes, as defined by
EPC articles 53(b) and 64(2).355 They also significantly broaden
the scope of patents for transgenic animals by stating that the
patent’s scope extends to all material that derives from the patented
product, whether in the same or divergent form, if it possesses the

animals and human beings. Human beings can never be patented, whereas animals can
be patented. An absolute principle is thus applied: human beings are not animals. The
legal reflection of this principle shows that the framers of Directive 98/44, unlike the
EPO, applied the virtue theory as well.
353
See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 69; Drahos, supra note 161, at 448.
354
Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 4.9.2 (TBA
1990).
355
Id., para. 4.8; see also Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 para. 4
(Enlarged Bd. of App. 1999).
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same characteristics. This will allow for a “chain patent,” whose
scope will expand continuously.356
Directive 98/44 article 9 provides that the protection conferred
by a patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic
information shall extend to all material in which the product is
incorporated and in which the genetic information is held and
performs its function—except where it involves human beings. As
a result of this provision, the questions about patentability of
transgenic animals and animal varieties under the EPC become, to
a large extent, irrelevant. A patent granted on a gene, or gene
construction, extends to the animals in which such a gene is
inserted and expressed. Acquisition of a patent on a gene will
suffice to obtain a de facto patent on all animals that possess and
express that gene.357 The exclusion of patentability of animal
varieties by EPC article 53(b) and by article 4(1)(a), will therefore
only be effective with respect to inventions that result in new
animal varieties (races).
Directive 98/44 articles 10 and 11 provide exceptions to the
scope provided for by articles 8 and 9. Article 10 contains a
restrictive first-sale-rule (exhaustion of patent) within the EU if the
biological material was obtained with the consent of the patentee
and is used for the purpose for which it was acquired. Subsequent
propagation or multiplication will, however, lead to patent
infringement. Pursuant to article 10, a breeder can mate the
acquired transgenic animals, as well as use acquired semen for
reproduction, if he or she has acquired these products with the
consent of the patentee within the EU and the reproduction serves
the purpose for which the products were acquired. Subsequent
animals may, however, not be used for reproduction. Article 10
thus provides for a breeders’ exemption.
356

This may lead to conflicting patents if, for example, two patented animals are crossed
to produce a third animal. Neither Directive 98/44, supra note 185, nor the EPC, supra
note 179, provides for a resolution to eventual conflicts. Most national patent laws of the
member states of the EU do not have “conflict provisions,” either. See, e.g., Dutch Patent
Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 (amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668).
357
See Robin Nott, “You Did It!”: The European Biotechnology Directive at Last, 20
EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 347, 348 (1998). This may lead to unsolvable conflicts
between patents. The patents on the gene, the process, and the animal may be in different
hands.
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Article 11(2) provides for a farmers’ exemption. The sale or
any other form of commercialization of breeding stock or other
animal reproductive material to a farmer by the holder of a patent
or with his consent implies authorization for the farmer to use the
protected life stock for an agricultural purpose. This includes
making the animal or the reproductive material available for the
purpose of pursuing his or her agricultural activity but not for sale
within the framework or purpose of a commercial reproduction
activity. Article 11(2) gives a farmer who, for example, produces
milk or cheese, the right to use the acquired transgenic animals or
semen for reproduction if this serves his agricultural goals. These
goals cannot include commercial breeding. It is likely that the
initial prices of transgenic animals and their materials will rise
because of the exemptions in articles 10 and 11. Thus, it may be
doubted whether these exemptions will serve the economic needs
of breeders and farmers.
Directive 98/44 article 12 provides for a compulsory license for
users of plant varieties and associated materials that fall within the
scope of a patent. Such licenses are not provided for users of
animal varieties and associated materials. Directive 98/44 article
13 allows for description of the invention for the purpose of
enablement as required by EPC article 83 and Dutch Patent Act
article 25 by deposit. It may be doubted, however, whether deposit
of transgenic animals can serve as description for enablement.358
5. Issues Reviewed
a) Novelty and Inventive Step
Patentability of transgenic animals, as provided for by the
reviewed case law and Directive 98/44, may not correspond with
the general requirements for patentability as defined by EPC article
52(a) and the patent laws of member states.359 As the Canadian
358

See supra note 168; infra text accompanying note 366.
See, e.g., Dutch Patent Act, art. 2; Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. 1, 2(1)(a),
4(2) (allowing animals to be patented as products; id. art. 9 (allowing animals to be
patented as material in which a patented product is inserted and expressed); id. arts.
2(1)(b), 4(3) (allowing animals to be patented as products by microbiological process);
id. arts. 4(1)(b), 2(2), 4(3), 8(2) (allowing animals to be patented as products by other
359
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Federal Court has noted with respect to the Harvard mouse: “the
presence of the myc gene is new, but the mouse is not new.”360
Thus, the patentability of entire animals may, strictly considered,
violate clear case law of the EPO and the EPC.361 Particularly, the
patentability of entire transgenic animals that have undergone only
minor genetic modifications may be problematic in view of the
usual assessment of the inventive step—the technical result of the
invention in view of the matter that was pre-existing.362
b) Enablement
The TBA has loosely applied the enablement requirement as
incorporated in EPC article 83.363 This may lead to patents that do
not cover their contents, because inventors need to describe their
invention as not comprising an animal of a particular race,
otherwise, it would be excluded from patentability.364 Because of
TBA’s loose application of EPC article 83, however, the inventors
can describe their invention in broad terms, i.e., comprising
various species, whereas the invention is only applied (and thus
processes); Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476. The absence of any
technical addition may be shown most clearly in the case of a gene, which is isolated
from its environment and inserted and expressed in an animal without further
modification. The processes of isolation and insertion may be technical according to the
traditional view. However, under Directive 98/44, supra note 185, articles 3(2) and 8(1)–
(2), patents will be granted not only to the processes, but also the gene, and all the
animals that carry such gene (whether produced via technical insertion of the gene or by
propagation).
360
Harvard College v. Canada, [1998] 3 F.C. 510, rev’d, [2000] 4 F.C. 528 (Can.).
361
See EPC, supra note 179, arts. 27(1)(a), 52(a), 54; Case V 8/94, Relaxin/Howard
Florey institute, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 388 para. 6 (Opposition Div. 1994).
362
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
363
Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 19(a). See also Spindler, Current
Patent Protection Granted For Genetically Modified Organisms Under The EPC and the
Scandal of EP 0695351, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 95, 112–15
(2001). After opposition procedures on July 22–24, 2002, the Edinburgh Patent, EP
0695351, was limited, so as to not include human or animal embryonic stem cells, but
still covers non-embryonic stem cells that are modified. See Press Release, EPO,
"Edinburgh" Patent Limited After European Patent Office Opposition Hearing (July 24,
2002), at http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2002_07_24_e.htm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2002). This meets Spindler’s criticism.
364
See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 4(1)(a), (2); Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000
O.J. E.P.O. 111 (Enlarged Bd. of App. 1999); Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O.
para. 19(a).

3-KOOPMAN FORMAT

174

12/12/02 3:19 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:103

enabled and disclosed) on one variety or race of one species.365 In
the long run, these patents do not serve the underlying goals of
patent law—stimulation of technological innovation.366 Patent
applicants may disclose the invention by deposit of the material
concerned: the animals.367 Deposit, however, may not lead to full
disclosure because the presence and expression of a gene in a
modified animal is not always externally perceivable.
Practical problems may arise by the deposit of entire animals at
the EPO.368 Furthermore, problems may arise because EPC article
54(3) provides that patent applications are part of the “prior art,”
and EPC article 92 provides for publication of the application.
One may doubt whether a third party can accurately acquire the
prior art from the publication of the application. Pursuant to EPC
article 13(2), third parties can acquire a sample of the deposited
material. One also may be skeptical about the enforcement of this
provision, in case a transgenic animal is deposited; or, to put it
differently, how many animals must be deposited to serve the goal
of this provision?
c) Exclusion of Animal Varieties
In view of the required broad description of the invention in the
patent application,369 the low standard applied to enablement and
repetition,370 the animals that are considered to be produced by
microbiological processes,371 the animals that are produced by
365

See Sven Bostyn, DNA—Octrooien, mag het een beetje meer zijn? [DNA—Patents,
Could It Be A Little More?], 2002 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 258, 258–59 (particular to
EU situation); Rochelle K Seide, Janet M. MacLeod & Carmella L. Stephens, Drafting
Claims for Biotechnology Inventions in 11TH ANNUAL PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP:
ADVANCED CLAIM DRAFTING & AMENDMENT WRITING at 294 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-00PK, 2001) (discussing
enablement difficulties in general).
366
See supra Part I.C; Funder, supra note 131, at 552.
367
See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 13.
368
See infra text accompanying notes 415–16.
369
See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 4(1)(a), (2); Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. at
111; Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 4.9.2 (TBA
1990).
370
See Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476.
371
See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. 2(1)(b), 4(3); Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O.
at 111; Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476.
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processes of sexual reproduction not being essentially
biological,372 the animals falling within the scope of the patents
granted on the gene they carry and express,373 and the animals
propagated from animals patented in one of these manners,374 one
can conclude that the exclusion of animal varieties does not have
much meaning left in the European Union at this time.
d) Ordre Public and Morality
The EPO will surely apply the exclusion from patentability of
inventions that are considered to be contrary to ordre public or
morality, particularly when an application embraces transgenic
animals.375 Onco-mouse/Harvard illustrates the manner in which
this exclusion will be applied by the EPO—via of balancing the
interests involved. As a result of Directive 98/44 article 6(1),
which provides that only inventions whose commercial application
violates ordre public or morality are unpatentable, it seems that all
inventions with other purposes may be patented. Note, however,
that one of the main goals of patent law is to allow the patentee to
exploit his/her invention commercially while excluding others
from doing the same. It is unlikely that inventors will apply for
patents without wanting to use them for such exploitation.376
372

Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. 2(2), 4(1)(b).
Id. art. 9.
374
Directive 98 /44, supra note 185, art. 8(1), (2). See Spindler, supra note 363
(discussing EP 0 695 351).
375
See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. (2)(d), 6(1); EPC, supra note 179, art.
53(a); Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476; EPO President Ingo Kober,
Address at the EPO Annual Press Conference (June 27, 2000) (excerpt available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2000_06_27_e.htm).
[O]ur patent examiners are keenly aware of the ethical problems attending such
applications . . . . There is . . . a staff notice . . . calling attention to the specific
items in the list of ethical prohibitions in the Directive. There is an early
warning system for ethically sensitive applications, and there are arrangements
of quality monitoring . . . .
Id.
376
See, e.g., the exclusive rights of a patentee under Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994,
Stb. 1995, 51 (amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668), art. 53(1)(a), (b)
(granting the patentee the exclusive right to “sell the patented product professionally” and
to “apply the patented process professionally”). Dutch Patent Act article 53(3) excludes
research and preparation of medicine in a pharmacy for an inventor’s private purposes
from the scope of the patent. Hence, at least in the Netherlands, the “commercial
restriction” of Directive 98/44, supra note 185, article 6(1) does not seem to make sense.
373
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Furthermore, Directive 98/44 does not provide a definition of the
term “commercially.” This creates uncertainty. In view of the
balancing test that is provided for in Directive 98/44 article
6(2)(d), definitions need to be formed. It is unclear what standards
should be applied, while balancing the “suffering” of animals with
the “substantial benefit” to humankind. The meaning of these
terms is unclear.
e) Definitions of Species
Directive 98/44 articles 5 and 6(1), (2)(a)–(c) provide that
human bodies, certain human materials, certain processes for
genetic modification of human beings, and human cloning are
unpatentable. Neither the EPC nor Directive 98/44 defines terms
such as “human body,” “human identity,” “human origin,” “human
being,” or what constitutes an animal, however.377 This seems
odd, especially because “plant variety” is given a particular
definition.378 The lack of a well set out and clear definitions may
cause problems when biotechnology advances and new inventions
are made which demand determination of their zoological
nature.379
f) Third Party Interests
In view of the approach of the EPO to EPC article 53(a), and
its detailed consideration of oppositions filed pursuant to EPC
article 99 in Onco-mouse/Harvard, it is likely that third parties,
such as animal rights groups, will increasingly be in a position to
express their opinions on the patenting of particular transgenic
animals (and other biotechnological inventions). Since under the
EPC opponents can file an opposition to a patent application, or to
an EPO patent until nine months after the issuance,380 the legal
certainty of patentees and their licensees may be diminished. In
view of Directive 98/44 article 7 and the advisory and evaluative
role of the European Group on Science and New Technologies (the
377

See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. 5, 6, and considerations 9, 16–17, 20–21,
26–27, 29, 38, 40–42, 44–45 (noting the terms applied).
378
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, considerations 30–32.
379
See supra Part II.D.3(d) for suggestions on definitions.
380
See EPC, supra note 179, art. 99(1).
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New Technologies Group), the non-technological aspects of
patenting transgenic animals (and other biotechnological
inventions) will be considered on a permanent basis. The New
Technologies Group will most likely attend to the interests of third
parties, such as animal rights groups and farmers, and will
influence further developments in European patent law.
Directive 98/44 articles 10 and 11 provide for exemptions to
the scope of patents for breeders and farmers. Article 12 does not
include a compulsory licensing scheme for these groups. Unless
the national legislatures regulate the patentees’ and licensees’
rights,381 it is likely that the exemptions of referenced articles will
not suit the economic needs of breeders and farmers. Patentees
will most likely raise prices of their products at initial acquisition
to include royalties that would, without the exemptions, be
collected afterwards.
IV. THE PATENTABILITY OF ANIMALS: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
A. Transgenic Animals as Subject Matter
Both in the U.S. and the EU, transgenic animals as such
(products) can fulfill the requirements for patentability.382 In the
U.S., the decisions in Chakrabarty383 and Ex parte Allen384 and the
Harvard mouse patent385 show that animals that do not occur in
nature could be patented.386 In the EU, Onco-mouse/Harvard and
Directive 98/44 articles 1, 2(1)(a), and 4(2) show that animals can
fulfill the requirements for patentability.387 Both in the U.S. and
the EU, the patent offices grant patents for the entire animals
381

See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, consideration 51.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Onco-mouse/Harvard
III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para. 4.8, .10 (Examining Div. 1992).
383
447 U.S. at 304. See also Quigg v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 900 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.
1990); Quigg, supra note 157.
384
2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426–27 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
385
See Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106.
386
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
387
See Onco-mouse/Harvard I, Case V 4/89, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. 451 (Examining Div.
1989), rev’d, Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (TBA 1990).
382
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concerned, but the actual invention may be the insertion of one
gene and expression thereof, to alter directly only a minor portion
of the genome of the animals.388 Clearly, both in the U.S. and the
EU, the patent offices uphold a low standard for novelty and
nonobviousness (in the EU, inventive step).389
Both in the U.S. and the EU, transgenic animals can be
patented as products-by-process. In the U.S., section 103(b) of the
Act provides that the products of biotechnological processes fall
within the scope of the patent on the process. In the EU, EPC
articles 53(b) (last sentence) and 64(2), Directive 98/44 article
2(1)(b), in conjunction with article 4(3) and articles 4(1)(b), 2(2),
4(3), and 8(2), and the decisions in Onco-mouse/Harvard and
Novartis II make it clear that animals fall within the scope of the
patents on the processes from which they derive.390
In the EU, animals are also protected by the patents on the
genes that are inserted into and expressed in them.391 This patent
protection is not available in the U.S. In this regard, the EU offers
more possibilities for animal patents. Both in the U.S. and in the
EU, genes as such are patentable.392 In the U.S., however, the
patent on the gene will not, by operation of law, extend to the
animals in which it is inserted and expressed. The animal
concerned has to be patented as a manufacture or composition of
matter or the process whereby it was modified.393 Only then will
the animal be within the scope of the patent. In the EU, the
inventor and patentee of a gene has the certainty that all animals in
which it is incorporated will be within the scope of his/her
388

See Onco-mouse/Harvard III, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589; Harvard mouse patent, supra
note 106. For other U.S. patents, see supra notes 111–116.
389
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2000); EPC, supra note 178, art. 52(1), 56; Directive
98/44, supra note 185, arts. 1, 2(1)(a), 3(1). For a different approach, see Harvard
College v. Canada, [1998] 3 F.C. 510, rev’d, [2000] 4 F.C. 528 (Can.); In re Deuel, 51
F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
390
Together with a loose application of the enablement requirement and crafty drafting
of (broad) claims, this latitude leads to the controversial scope of patent EP 0 695 351.
See Spindler supra note 361.
391
See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 9.
392
Compare In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1558, with Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art.
3(2).
393
See Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426 (BPAI 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 77
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
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patent.394 Conversely, in the U.S., inventors can apply openly for
patents on transgenic animals as such.395 Thus, they can attempt to
acquire a patent on one modified animal, a group of animals, a
variety, and—in case such will prove to be possible in the future—
a race that has been created through biotechnology. In the EU, an
application cannot directly focus on one animal or animals
belonging to one race.396
B. Restrictions on Patentability
In the U.S., laws and products of nature are not patentable.397
In principle, animals produced by propagation are produced
through a process that is subjected entirely to the laws of nature,
and are themselves products of nature.398 However, the PTO and
courts apply the doctrines of laws of nature and products of nature
restrictively.399 This is also revealed by some of the patents that
the PTO has granted for transgenic animals produced by sexual
reproduction; some claims explicitly include such animals within
their scope.400 Other patents implicitly include such sexually
produced offspring.401
In the EU, essentially biological processes and their products
are not patentable,402 but an essentially biological process has to
consist entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing or
selection.403 Thus, processes of sexual reproduction that are
carried out with a slight human intervention may be subject to

394

See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75, 100, 106, 383, 384.
396
See EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(b).
397
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
398
See id. at 310.
399
See id. at 309; Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
400
See U.S. Patent No. 5,221,779 (issued 1993, withdrawn) (The claim includes “ . . .
transgenic mouse offspring produced by the mating . . . .”).
401
See Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106, (claiming a “transgenic non-human
mammal . . . or an ancestor”); U.S. Patent No. 5,648,597 (issued July 15, 1997),
(claiming a “transgenic mouse or the progeny thereof ”).
402
EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(b); see also Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art.
4(1)(b).
403
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 2(2).
395
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patent law, as may the products (animals) thereof.404 Therefore,
the patent offices and courts of the U.S. and EU restrictively apply
the doctrines that deal with products that occur naturally.
In the U.S., an invention must be useful pursuant to article 101
of the Act.405 Utility is, in principle, also related to the benefits
that derive from an invention to society.406 The PTO and county
apply this doctrine very restrictively with respect to inventions
consisting of transgenic animals.407 The PTO’s only moral
restriction on patentability of living subject matter deals with
human/animal chimeras,408 but the distinction between what is
“human” and what is “animal” is unclear.409 The various patents
granted for animals containing human genes seem to suggest that
the PTO will not consider an invention a human/animal chimera as
long as its genome consists mostly of naturally occurring, nonhuman genes. Although at least one federal court decision seems
to suggest that the doctrine of beneficial utility may be invoked
more often with respect to biotechnological inventions—such as
transgenic animals—this is not very likely.410 In the EU, EPC
article 53(a) and Directive 98/44 article 6 provide for exclusions
from patentability of inventions that are contrary to ordre public
and morality. These grounds for exclusion are similar to the
grounds that would govern if the PTO applied a broad doctrine of
beneficial utility.411
Onco-mouse/Harvard shows that these
exclusions are fully effective under the EPC and that inventions are
404

See the patent granted in Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O.
589 (Examining Div. 1992) (Claim 17 encompasses a “transgenic non-human
mammalian . . . or an ancestor of said animal . . . .”).
405
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
406
See Magnani, supra note 100, at 452.
407
See supra notes 160–161.
408
See Quigg, supra note 157.
409
See supra note 161. Because of the lack of an unequivocal distinction between what
is “human” and what is not, it will not be easy to apply moral restrictions. Practical
application will certainly be controversial. For a socio-political, philosophical, and, here
and there, legal perspective on the matter, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN
FUTURE, CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION, part 3 (2002).
410
See Tol-o-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546,
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991); supra note 155.
411
Compare EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(a), and Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art.
6(1), with Tol-o-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1553, In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178–81 (C.C.P.A.
1960), and Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
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indeed reviewed with regard to their purposes and consequences.
Onco-mouse/Harvard and article 6(2)(d) provide for a balancing
test between, on one hand, the benefits to humanity deriving from
the invention and, on the other hand, the animal suffering caused.
The President of the EPO recently confirmed this approach in a
public statement.412 The constitution of the European Group on
Science and New Technologies, as stated in Directive 98/44 article
7, also states that these exclusions will remain active in European
patent law—perhaps more active then ever before. Thus, when
patent applications are received in the EU, the EPO and national
patent offices will consider non-technological concerns, such as
those related to the well-being of animals, the overall ethical
consequences of a certain invention, and environmental protection.
These considerations are not included in the review of a patent
application by the PTO and U.S. courts.
Both in the U.S. and the EU, human-related inventions are
more or less excluded from patentability.413
In the U.S.,
human/animal chimeras are not statutorily excluded from
patentability, but the PTO has announced that it will not issue
patents for human/animal chimaeras.414 The basis for this
exclusion is unclear.415 Also, neither the PTO nor courts have
determined what constitutes a “human” and what constitutes an
“animal.”416 In the EU, the exclusion of human-related materials
from patentability has a statutory basis—in the EPC pursuant to the
incorporation of Directive 98/44 in its Implementing Rules, and

412

See Kober, supra note 375.
See Directive 98/44, supra note 185; Tol-o-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1553; Nelson, 280
F.2d at 178–81; Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
414
Compare EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(a), and Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art.
6(1), with Tol-o-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1553, Nelson, 280 F.2d at 178–81, and Lowell, 15 F.
Cas. at 1019.
415
It has been suggested that this exclusion derives from the U.S. Constitution’s
prohibition on slavery, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See Fishman, supra note 159, at 472–
80; Walter, supra note 46, at 1047. Both authors reject this ground for the exclusion, as
the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits human servitude, not a temporary right to combine
human and animal genes.
416
See supra note 111.
413
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within the near future in the member states after full
implementation in their patent acts.417
Directive 98/44 article 5(1) determines that the human body, in
its various stages of development, cannot be patentable. Clauses 2
and 3 of this provision state conditions under which human genes
may be patented. Directive 98/44 article 6(2) (a)–(c) states that
processes for human cloning, processes for modifying the germ
line identity of human beings, and uses of embryos for industrial or
commercial application are unpatentable. Arguably, the products
deriving from these processes may be patentable. Although the
unpatentable inventions that relate to human beings have been
specified more in European patent law than in the U.S., the
definitions of these materials also remain unclear in the EU.
Neither the EPC nor Directive 98/44 gives a definition for what
constitutes a “human being” and what constitutes an “animal.”
Thus, both the patent regimes of the U.S. and the EU contain a
critical uncertainty in their terminology. In view of the rapidly
advancing biotechnology, there is a pressing need for formation
and inclusion of clear definitions.418
C. Enablement
Both U.S. and European patent law provide for the deposit of
biological material in order to fulfill the enablement requirements
under the respective regimes.419 Under both regimes, however,
deposit as such will most likely not lead to de facto full disclosure.
417

See, e.g., Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of the
European Union, 2001 O.J. (C 331) 231, 231–45 (2002) (rejecting the Netherlands
requests for invalidation of Directive 98/44). The Netherlands is obliged to implement
Directive 98/44 immediately in the Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51
(amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668). Resistance in the Netherlands
continues, however, and therefore the controversy is likely to be prolonged. See Sven
Bostyn, Het Sprookje is uit. De beslissing van het Europese Hof inzake de Nederlandse
vodering tegen richtlijn 94/44/EG [The Fairy Tale is Over. The European Court’s
Decision in Regard to the Dutch Claim Against Directive 94/44/EC], 11 BIE 392 (2001);
Andrew Scott, The Dutch Challenge to the Bio-Patenting Directive, 1999 EUROPEAN
INTELL. PROP. REV. 212.
418
See Ducor, supra note 158, at 259; Fishman, supra note 159, at 478–80; Jagels,
supra note 77, at 146.
419
Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114 (2000), with EPC, supra note 179, art. 83, and
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 13.
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This is because the expression of genes within animals may not be
observable externally. Also, practical problems may arise, such as
the storage and maintenance of the animals. In Europe, patent
applications become part of the prior art.420 In view hereof, EPC
article 92 provides for immediate publication when applications
are filed. This is because under European patent law the EPO
issues patents to the first one to file the application (first-to-file
system). Directive 98/44 article 13(2) provides, therefore, for the
issuance of samples of the material immediately after its deposit to
interested parties. In the case of the deposit of transgenic animals,
one may doubt how this would be arranged—without demanding
that the applicant deposit numerous animals. In the U.S., pursuant
to section 122(a) of the Act, patent applications at the PTO were
confidential until the law was changed in November 1999 to
require publication 18 months after the earliest filing date.421 This
is because under U.S. patent law the PTO issues patents to the first
one to invent (first-to-invent system). After a patent has been
granted by the PTO, samples may be obtained by interested parties
as well; the same questions about how this should be done with
entire animals arise as in the EU. Thus, both under the patent
regimes of the U.S. and the EU, there are problems with respect to
disclosure and enablement of inventions consisting of transgenic
animals. These problems lead to a lack of internal (towards the
patent offices) and external (towards third parties) disclosure.422
In view of the substantial review of the repeatability of the
invention, pursuant to the enablement requirement, it is likely that
the PTO will have a more traditional and strict test than the EPC.
Under U.S. patent law, single transgenic animals and groups of
animals belonging to or forming the same race can be patented.
This will allow inventors to construct their claims, and to provide
descriptions, in an accurate manner—and the PTO will review

420

EPC, supra note 179, art. 54(3).
See Pub. L. No. 106-13, 113 Stat. 1501a-563 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122).
422
See Czmus, supra note 168, at 440–41. Czmus also mentions problems that relate to
the discrepancies that exist between the U.S. and the EU on the release criteria for
samples and the existing disparity between the deposit deadlines.
421
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these accordingly.423 Under EU law, applicants are forced to
construct their claims and provide descriptions in a broad manner,
comprising not only one animal or a group of animals belonging to
the same race, but also other animal races (or even higher
taxonomical units). It is clear that the EPO will not review
repeatability too strictly, for if it were to do so it is likely that many
patents could not be granted.424 This may lead to patents that are
too broad and are not justified by the underlying inventions.425 A
careful balance has to be struck between not granting an inventor
patents that are too limited and not granting him/her patents that
are too broad in order to serve the purpose of patent law
(technological innovation).426 In view of the foregoing, it may be
concluded that the PTO strikes this balance better than the EPO,
the approach of which may be considered to be out of balance.427
D. Scope of Patents
Both under the patent regimes of the U.S. and the EU, the
patent offices grant patents for genetically modified animals, as
well as their offspring.428 The terms applied in Directive 98/44
article 8 (“propagation and multiplication”) are, however, broader
423
In fact, this has happened since the broad Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106, was
granted. Most, but not all, patents granted after 1988 have a more limited scope. See,
e.g., supra notes 111–116.
424
See Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (TBA 1990). Also
see the final patent granted in Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O.
589 (Examining Div. 1992).
425
See supra notes 111–116.
426
See supra Part I.D.
427
Compare the Act, 35 §§ U.S.C. 100–122 (2000); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980), Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1427 (BPAI 1987), aff’d,
846 F. 2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106, and the patents
mentioned in notes 111–16, with EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(b), Directive 98/44, supra
note 185, art. 4 (1)(a),(2); Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 (Enlarged Bd.
of App. 1999), and Onco-mouse/Harvard III, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. at 589.
428
Compare the Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106, (claiming a “transgenic nonhuman mammal . . . or an ancestor”), with the patent granted in the Onco-mouse/Harvard
III, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. at 589 (claiming a “transgenic non-human mammalian . . . or an
ancestor of said animal”). See also Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 8 (extending
patent protection to material obtained through propagation or multiplication of patented
products); e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,648,597 (1997) (claiming “a transgenic mouse or
progeny thereof”); U.S. Patent No. 5,221,779 (1993) (claiming “ transgenic mouse
offspring produced by the mating”).
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than the terms found in patents granted so far for transgenic
animals under U.S. patent law (“offspring,” “progeny,” and similar
terms). The latter do not include clones of the animals concerned,
whereas the term “multiplication” in Directive 98/44 article 8
especially addresses these reproductions of the patented animals.
E. Third Party Interests
Under U.S. patent law, no exception to the scope of patents
granted on transgenic animals exists,429 in contrast to European
patent law that provides for detailed and specific exceptions for
both breeders and farmers (Directive 98/44 article 10 and 11).430
Note that the exhaustion rule of Directive 98/44 article 10 is
triggered only if the material is acquired in the EU; thus, U.S.
farmers will have to go to Europe to acquire the preferred
materials. It may be doubted whether U.S. breeders’ and farmers’
economic interests will be seriously affected by the absence of
such an exemption.431 If, however, their interests suffer, it may be
doubted whether an exemption, as articles 10 and 11 of Directive
98/44 provide, will be sufficient to protect these interests.
Patentees could prevent any loss of income by demanding higher
prices at the initial acquisition of the animals or animal material—
and the European exemptions would then be useless.432
Pursuant to the decision in Animal Legal Defense Fund, it
seems that third parties, such as animal rights groups and farmers,
cannot bring direct actions to challenge the validity of a patent
issued under U.S. law, e.g., with respect to its subject matter,

429

See supra Part II.D.3(f).
See supra Part III.D.5(f).
431
See Hecht, supra note 104, at 1073 (suggesting that patentees will not find it
economically necessary to enforce their rights to the full extent and collect royalties);
Walter, supra note 46, at 1041–42 (suggesting that the benefits of the transgenic animals
will lower costs for farmers drastically, even if the higher acquisition prices and royalties
are included and that inventors would without patent protection license out their animals
more selectively). The latter suggestion is based on the assumption that alternative legal
instruments, like the general law of contracts, will not provide enough protection to the
inventor. This assumption is reviewed and confirmed. See ENZING, supra note 174, at 21;
Straus, supra note 219, at 929; Von Pechmann, supra note 174.
432
See Walter, supra note 46, at 1042.
430
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contents or scope.433 This may seriously hamper the influence
“outsiders” can exercise on the development of the patent law with
respect to biotechnological inventions.434 Under European patent
law, third parties—like referenced ones—have opportunities to
express their opinions with respect to the patenting of a certain
invention. EPC article 99 provides for an opposition procedure
that can be initiated by “anyone” until nine months after the patent
is granted (clause 1). The TBA of the EPO has taken oppositions
filed under EPC article 99 very seriously and has included them in
its review—for example, regarding to the exclusions of EPC article
53(a).435 This approach was recently confirmed by the President of
the EPO.436 Also, Directive 98/44 article 6 provides for a broad
test of ordre public and morality. In view of the foregoing, it can
be concluded that the concerns of third parties are likely to be
heard during, or shortly after, the review of a patent application
filed under the EPC. These concerns, however, cannot be
expressed in a like manner at a similar time in the U.S. Obviously,
other means, such as negotiating with interest groups, lobbying at a

433

See Quigg v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 900 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1990); MERGES, supra
note 62, at 751–95; Hecht, supra note 104, at 1059–60 (referring to challenges on other
grounds than “inequitable conduct” (fraud) or “double patenting”). The animal rights
groups and farmers (plaintiffs) in Quigg objected to the patenting of transgenic animals
on moral and economic grounds, respectively. The doctrines of “inequitable conduct”
and “double patenting” are not suitable for addressing these objections.
434
But see Drahos, supra note 161, at 447. Drahos strongly opposes this lax situation.
He argues that civilians should have a voice in the developments, because of the
profound influence patent law has on their life. Arguably, Drahos’ position does not
seem more justifiable with respect to biotechnological inventions than with other types—
mechanical and chemical inventions could have strong influences on the civilian life, as
history has shown. The complexity of the invention at issue presents a problem to direct
civilian participation. The influence might be useful only when the inventions are truly
understood. See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 66 (stating that external societal
influences influences on patent litigation may, however, increase the legitimacy and,
therefore, the certainty of the patent).
435
For the TBA’s final considerations and interests-balancing illustrated through
opposition procedures, see Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476
(TBA 1990). See also Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para.
2 (Examining Div. 1992).
436
See Kober, supra note 375.
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political level, and raising broad public attention to the issues
concerned may very well be available in the U.S.437
European patent law generally provides for compulsory
licensing in cases of “public interest.”438 These licenses are rarely
granted by the national authorities, e.g., the minister of economic
affairs,439 a court,440 or a patent office.441 Nonetheless, the system
of compulsory licensing may provide a basis for protection of the
437

These means are shown by the various bills that have been initiated in Congress,
which served the interests of animal rights groups and/or farmers. See Hecht, supra note
104, at 1057–58.
438
See, e.g., EPC, supra note 179, art. 73; Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995,
51 (amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668), arts. 57–58; WICHERS HOETH,
supra note 53, at 59, 69.
439
Dutch Patent Act art. 57
440
Id. art. 58
441
For example, in the Netherlands, compulsory licenses for algemeen belang [public
interest] have been granted just twice, both by the Dutch Patent Office, shortly after the
Second World War. See Dutch Patent Office, 1946 BIE, Nov. 25, 1946, at 9. The
minister of economic affairs had considered a compulsory license just once, and rejected
it. The minister determined that the “public interest” must eclipse the general
governmental policy goals, which the case did not do. See Decree of the Minister of
Economic Affairs, BIE 1981, Jan. 9, 1980, at 185. “Public interest” is not the individual
corporation’s interest in competitive advantage, unless the product concerned could be
marketed by another party for a lower price, and other circumstances necessitate such.
See Chamber of Appeal, Patent Office, BIE, Feb. 17, 1932, at 136; Chamber of Appeal,
Patent Office, BIE, July 19, 1972, at 236. Furthermore, the Dutch Supreme Court has
approached the issue of compulsory licenses and authorization of patent infringement
carefully and restrictively. See Dutch Supreme Court, BIE, Apr. 21, 1995, at 409 (holding
that, in principle, the interests of third parties should not be protected by allowing patent
infringement).
Six years before, the President of the District Court of The Hague had allowed
infringement (a de facto compulsory license). It held that patients’ interest in having
access to certain medicines outweighed the patentee’s stated financial interest, which
could be safeguarded by damages or other compensation. President of the District Court
of The Hague, Nov. 21, 1989, No. 89/2069 (unpublished). Both cases addressed section
168 of book of 6 of the Dutch Civil Code, which could serve as a defence to a patentee’s
claim for prohibition of infringement, and hence could lead to a de facto compulsory
license.
In Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court] has determined that öffentliche
Interesse [public interest] is to be defined and applied according to the circumstances of
the case, and a balancing between the patentee’s interests and the societal interests. In
case other, similar but not identical and infringing products are available, the balance
favours the patentee: a “public interest” for a compulsory license is not present. See 1996
GRUR INT’L 948; de Ranitz, Dwanglicenties: Heden Verleden en Toekomst [Compulsory
Licenses: Past, Present and Future] 2 IER 42–47 (1992).
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interests of third parties that have a pressing need to make use of
the invention. U.S. patent law does not provide for compulsory
licensing.442 Recently, an international discussion has arisen
among governments, patentees, and other interested parties about
the need for compulsory licenses for patented inventions, such as
medicines, which are of profound importance to humanity. This
discussion derives from the exclusionary power of the patentee,
which may directly harm those in need of the patented
invention.443
V. HARMONIZATION
A. General Remarks
The foregoing shows that the extent to and the manner in
which transgenic animals can be patented under U.S. and European
patent law differs significantly. This is analogous to the content
and scope of patents that are granted by the respective patent
offices. The discrepancies concerned may damage the continuous
and successful technological innovation that is pursued by patent
law.444 Lack of clarity, uncertainty, and differing requirements for,
and standards of, protection would not contribute to the incentive
of the mostly globally active inventors in the field of
biotechnology.
On the contrary, it would increase the
442

See MERGES, supra note 62, at 189.
See F.M. Scherer, Taking Stock: The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property
Rights: The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property Standards, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2249 (2000); Rosemary Sweeney, The U.S. Push for Worldwide
Patent Protection for Drugs Meets the AIDS Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating Collision,
9 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 445, 463–67 (2000); Melody Peterson, Suits Accuse Drug
Makers of Keeping Generics Off the Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at C1; Sheryl G.
Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, Keeping Down the Competition: How Companies Stall Generics
and Keep Themselves Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at A1; Karl Vick, African
AIDS Victims Losers of a Drug War; US Policy Keeps Prices Prohibitive, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 1999, at A1. Given the scope of this article, the details of this debate are not
discussed further.
444
See SHERWOOD, supra note 53, at 67, 191 (comparing European and U.S. patent
law); Josh Lerner, Patent Policy Innovations: A Clinical Examination, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1841, 1842–45 (2000); North, supra note 53, at 131–32; (discussing the interaction
between patent law policy and economy); supra Part I.D (providing an extensive
economic analysis).
443
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“appropriability problem.”445
Harmonization is needed!446
Although the international intellectual property framework was not
reviewed above, since the end of the nineteenth century,
governments and international organizations have attempted to
harmonize national patent law.447 The Convention of Paris for the
Protection of Industrial Property provides to its members,
including EU member states and the U.S., international patent
protection.448 It provides, inter alia, a priority right for inventors,
who also have the opportunity to file multiple applications
simultaneously with the offices of the members.449 In 1967,
numerous countries formed the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) with the purpose of harmonizing patent
law.450 Although some achievements have hereinafter been made,
the most important initiative of WIPO, creating a universal
application procedure, has failed.451
The Geneva Patent
Harmonization Treaty (GPHT)452 derives from WIPO. It provides
445

See K.W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings Of Patent Law, 1994 J. LEGAL STUD.
246, 246–47 (providing extensive analysis of the stimulating function of patent law, the
influences on the incentive of inventors, and the problem of appropriability).
446
See Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in
International Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 277, 280–81 (2001); Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent
Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 591, 591–92 (1994); North, supra note 53, at 131–32; Carrie
P. Smith, Patenting Life: The Potential and the Pitfalls of Using the WTO to Globalize
Intellectual Property Rights, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 143, 180–81 (2000).
447
See generally Gerald J. Mossinghot & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent Systems Circa
20XX, A.D., 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 523, 525–40 (1998) (describing patent
treaties and regional patent systems).
448
Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 (as
revised July 14, 1967), 21 U.S.T. 1583; 24 U.S.T. 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
449
See id. art. 4.
450
Convention Establishing WIPO, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
451
See Dotson, supra note 200, at 923 (noting that WIPO has never recognized patent
protection for transgenic animals, and concludes, therefore, that it may not be the
appropriate organization to address the discrepancies in transgenic patent law); North,
supra note 53, at 137–38 (describing similar attempts by others). One of the reasons for
the failure in creating a universal application procedure is related to the essential
differences between the first-to-file systems effective in the EU, Japan and most of the
world, and the first-to-invent system that is effective in the U.S. See generally, Kevin
Cuenot, Note, Perilous Potholes in the Path Toward Patent Law Harmonization, 11 J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 101 (1999) (providing a historic and legal overview of the failure to
harmonize patent laws). First steps towards harmonization are being made, however. See
supra note 316.
452
See Czmus, supra note 168, at 459–60.
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for some initial steps towards harmonization of the first-to-file
systems of the EU and Japan, and the first-to-invent system of the
U.S.453 Furthermore, it determines that the patent duration is
twenty years, and provides for a single format of the patent
application.454 In the course of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), the countries concerned formulated the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).455 TRIPS
confirms the duration of patents, as provided for under the GPHT.
In the course of TRIPS, parties attempt to bring the first-to-file
system (EU) and the first-to-invent system (U.S.) closer towards
one another and to take away the discrepancies that derive from the
application of these different systems.456
TRIPS also contains provisions that influence the substantive
patent law of its members. For example, article 27(1) sets forth a
minimum standard for patentable subject matter. It determines that
patents must be available for “inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application.”457 Also, article 27(2) provides that members may
exclude inventions from patentability, if the commercial
exploitation of these inventions must be prevented in view of the
public order or good morals, including the protection of human,
animal and plant life and the protection of the environment.
Article 27(3) provides for an exclusion from patentability of
animals and plants, and essentially biological processes for the
production of plants and animals, which are not microbiological or
biological processes.458 These and other provisions of TRIPS only
provide for minimum standards and exceptions thereto, however,
which are not defined in detail. Members of TRIPS can decide to
453

See id.
See id.
455
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], ANNEX 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm.
456
See Czmus, supra note 168, at 462.
457
TRIPS, supra note 454, art. 27(1).
458
The EU has made use of this provision; the U.S. has not. See Cheek, supra note 446,
at 292–96.
454
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make use of the exceptions or not (the EU has made use of this
exception; the U.S. has not). They also can go beyond TRIPS and
provide more extensive protection under their patent regimes.
Thus, the few substantive provisions of TRIPS do not form a solid
basis for harmonization of the regimes discussed.459 Another
treaty, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), provides for the filing
of one application that serves as an application in all forty-four
members.460 The U.S. and the EPC—and its members—are also
PCT members but the PCT only addresses the application and not
the substantive examination of its compliance with the
requirements for patentability and, therefore, does not serve
harmonization in this respect too well either.
In view of the foregoing, harmonization should be pursued by
the respective patent offices and/or by the national and regional
(EU) legislators—the latter being in a position to substantially
change the regimes under which the patent offices grant or deny
patents.
The failed attempts to achieve this on a broad
international level may justify bi- or trilateral legislative actions.461
Such action should be concentrated on the substantive
requirements for, and exclusions from patentability.462 Hence, this
article now turns to a proposal concerning the manner in which
those individual requirements and exclusions in the patent laws of
the U.S. and the EU could best be harmonized with regard to
transgenic animals.
B. Patent Requirements Revisited
1. Novelty and Nonobviousness
The different novelty standards applied under U.S. and EU
patent law (respectively the first-to-invent and first-to-file
459

See Cheek, supra note 446, at 292–96; Carlos M. Correa, The GATT Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: New Standards for Patent
Protection, 16 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 327 (1994).
460
The Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645; 1160 U.N. T. S. 231.
461
See Cheek, supra note 446, at 289–92, 300–09, 315–21; Cuenot, supra note 450, at
102–08; Czmus, supra note 168, at 459, 462.
462
See Michael Meller, Principles of Patentability and Some Other Basics for a Global
Patent System, 83 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 359, 359–60 (2001).
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standards) need harmonization. Their specific workings, including
the definitions of what constitutes prior art, the grace periods
granted, and prior use exceptions, as well as the procedural
complexities that derive from them are disregarded here.463
Although the different standards applied profoundly influence the
manner in which inventions are patentable, and therefore need
harmonization, the patenting of transgenic animals are not
influenced any more greatly than that of other inventions.464
Furthermore, although both standards lead to a different conclusion
as to what constitutes prior art, the examination of that art does not
seem to be different in the U.S. and the EU. In principle, the
substantive application of the nonobviousness adhered to under
U.S. and EU patent law does not differ significantly.465 Under
both regimes, the biotechnological steps taken are acknowledged
and inventors can obtain patents with broad claims for their
transgenic animals.
Generally, however, the claims of U.S. patents for transgenic
animal patents seem to be narrower than the claims of EU patents.
463

See Cuenot, supra note 450, at 113; Meller, supra note 462, at 362 (discussing
“novelty”); Toshiko Takenaka, Impact of 1999 Patent Reforms: A Comparative Law
Perspective, 7 CASRIP NEWSL. 2 (2000).
464
A general note: only the patent laws of the U.S. and the Philippines still apply the
first-to-invent standard. In the U.S., patents can be granted to the first one to “conceive”
or to “reduce the invention to practice.” Novelty is tested against worldwide publications
existing prior to the application filing, and against all uses within the U.S. 35 U.S.C. §
102(a)–(b) (2000). Conversely, pursuant to the patent law in the EU, patents are granted
to the first one to file a patent application, and novelty is tested according to all
communications and uses before such filing. EPC, supra note 179, art. 54(1), (2).
Arguably, the first-to-invent standard creates a greater risk for granting the patent to an
applicant that is not the inventor, or his successor in right, than is the case with the firstto-file standard. Also, the first-to-invent standard, with its complex substantive and
procedural characteristics, seems to benefit larger inventors and companies, whereas the
first-to-file standard leads to equal consideration of all inventors, whether small or large.
See Mossinghot & Kuo, supra note 447, at 542; Murashige, supra note 446, at 608–09.
But see Meller, supra note 462 (arguing that the first-to-invent standard, with its relative
novelty requirement, is better suited to deal with communications in present times—the
fact that scientists and researchers collaborate in development of inventions and
frequently share information, e.g. by e-mail). EPC article 55(1)(a)–(b) is not as harsh as
he argues. Of course, the narrow exceptions of EPC article 55(1)(a)–(b) cannot negate
Meller’s argument, since they are only focused on a period of six months prior to the
filing of the application, whereas the research and development usually takes several
years before completion.
465
See Meller, supra note 462, at 367–69 (discussing “unobviousness”).
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This may indicate that the EPO applies a lower nonobvioussness
(inventive step) standard than the PTO. Such application may be
related to the pre-grant opposition system of EPO article 99, the
first-to-file system, and the opportunity for compulsory licensing
under EU patent law.466 The lower standard for the inventive step
in the EU may also derive from the exclusion from patentability of
animal races of EPC article 53(b). This exclusion forces applicants
to construct broad claims, not including one race but higher
taxonomical units, even though their invention may be directly
aimed at one animal variety or race only. The EPO does not apply
the enablement requirement in a strict manner, and therefore small
inventive steps pass muster so as to make the patenting of
transgenic animals possible.467 Pursuant to both the U.S. and EU
patent laws, insertion of genes into an animal, wherein they are
expressed, may lead to a patent on the animal. One could argue,
however, that the inventions involved—insertion and expression of
genes—do not justify a patent on the entire animal. The
mechanical equivalent would be to grant the inventor of a lens a
patent on the camera to which it is attached.468 This practice
derives from the characteristics of the inventions involved; they
cannot be separated and distinguished from the animal, which, in
turn, can reproduce itself. Presently, there seems to be no
alternative for this manner of protection of the inventions involved.
Further research into the specific workings and influence of the
inventions concerned may be deemed necessary.469 Nevertheless,
466

See D.J. Abraham, Shinpo-Sei: Japanese Inventive Step Meets U.S. Nonobviousness,
77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 528, 529–30 (1995) (stating that the Japanese
Patent Office’s lower nonobviousness requirement may come from several factors,
among which are the ones mentioned above, present in the EU).
467
The proposal for a uniform application of a common standard for enablement is
described infra Part V.B.6.
468
See Harvard College v. Canada, [1998] 3 F.C. 510, rev’d, [2000] 4 F.C. 528 (Can.)
(refusing to issue the patent for the Harvard mouse, holding that the insertion and
expression of the gene in the mouse may be novel, but the mouse was not); R. Stephen
Crespi, Patents and Plant Variety Rights: Is There an Interface Problem? INT’L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 168–84 (1992) (analogizing of the mechanical parts to the
car as a who and stating that this deviation from traditional patent law occurs with respect
to both plant and animal biotechnological inventions).
469
See Ryan M.T. Iwasaka, Note, Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for
Evolutionary Biology in Patent Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505, 1519 (2000). Iwasaka
proposes a test for novelty and nonobviousness that is based on a methodology used in
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patent law harmonization is not needed as far as the patentability
of transgenic animals as such is concerned.
In the EU, however, a patent on a gene will, by operation of
law, embrace the animal in which it is incorporated and expressed.
This approach definitely evades legal discussion about the novelty
of the animal, and its subjection to patent law, but completely
ignores its traditional principles and requirements. It is in line with
the general pro-patent approach to inventions that comprise
insertion and expression of genes into animals. It may be called a
cheap solution (rigorous expansion of the contents and scope of a
patent) for an expensive problem (lack of insight into the actual
invention while, protecting it in view of the reproductive capacities
of the vehicle, the animal). The same applies to the EPO’s
application of the inventive step requirement to applications that
claim higher taxonomical units than races, or species.470 In this
respect, it may be deemed appropriate to bring the patent law of
the EU in line with the patent law of the U.S., where the original
restrictive approach for nonobviousness is upheld.
2. Animal Races
In the EU, animal races are excluded from patentability if they
are mentioned specifically in the application, but they are
patentable if the application is directed at higher or lower
taxonomical units. Since they are thus patentable anyhow, by
overbroad patents that embrace entire zoological orders, it would
be more appropriate to follow the U.S. approach, meaning that an
inventor can openly apply for a patent on a particular variety of an

evolutionary biology; the human interference with the animal in its natural evolutionary
course should be appraised according to factors such as the probability that the genetic
mutation would have occurred without that interference, and the existence of the animal
contrary to natural selection. He argues that such a test would be more formalistic and
would be more certain than the tests presently applied. In the author’s view, Iwasaka’s
proposal offers a starting point for development of an appropriate novelty and
nonobviousness test for an invention that consists of insertion and expression of strange
genes in an animal. It acknowledges that present standards derive from different times
and are not optimally suited for application to these types of inventions.
470
See infra Part V.B.2, .6.
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animal race. This will allow inventors to specify their invention
and will prevent issuance of patents that do not cover their load.471
3. Sexually Produced Offspring
In the U.S., the products of entirely sexual (biological)
processes may be patentable. The EU approach differs only
slightly, but enough to ensure that the products of processes of
sexual reproduction are only patentable if the processes have been
carried out with some human intervention. The latter approach is
most in compliance with the aim of patent law: stimulation of
technological progress through an exchange of information
(containing the particulars of a novel biotechnological
advancement) and a patent. Thus, the patent laws involved should
be harmonized by adopting the EU approach.
4. Morality
In the U.S., the beneficial utility of an invention is not deemed
to be important. Most likely, the lack of beneficial utility (or
immorality) of an invention will not be a limitation on its
patentability. In the EU, the exclusion from patentability of
inventions that are violating ordre public or morality is active and
applied, albeit restrictively. Even though the exploitation of, for
example, an extremely dangerous patented invention (lacking
beneficial utility) is regulated by other laws than patent law in the
U.S., one could argue that this does not sufficiently influence their
development. Arguably, an inventor who knows that he will not
receive a patent on an invention will have a lot of trouble
developing it, acquiring the necessary funds and recouping the
expenses afterwards. Also, one could argue that it is a matter of
fairness that an inventor should, at least, have a reasonable
expectation of its permitted exploitation after acquisition of the
patent. In view of the far-reaching impact of biotechnology, the
importance of responsible and restrictive development is
emphasized, and such can be ensured best through the instrument
471

See TRIPS, supra note 454, art. 27(3) (allowing member states to exclude animal
races from patentability). The reason for this exclusion is that animal races can only be
produced through biological and not technological means—is outdated and should be
modified.
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that so profoundly influences the rate at which biotechnological
applications are developed, i.e., patent law. Obviously, a moral
test is hard to apply, but so is the test of nonobviousness, or, in
general contract law, the tests of equity or reasonableness and
fairness. Naturally, legal rules must not be made dependent on the
swiftly changing morality of the day, as their certainty and
reliability is of great importance. The rules themselves, however,
exist because of morality, and it should be possible to develop a
fairly accurate and certain moral test that can be applied to a
particular invention. In view hereof, it may be desirable to include
consideration of all (including) features and consequences of an
invention in the examination. U.S. patent law should be brought
into line with the patent law of the EU in this respect.472

472

The balancing test provided for by the EPC, supra note 179, article 53(a), and
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, article 6 may need specification and is not certain
enough yet. It does, however, provide a starting point for consideration of the moral
impacts of an invention in patent examination. See Donna M. Gitter, Led Astray by the
Moral Compass: Incorporating Morality into European Union Biotechnology Law, 19
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 40, 40–43 (2001). Note that Gitter ignores Case G 1/98, Novartis
II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 (Enlarged Bd. of App. 1999), in her analysis. A fairly accurate
moral test could be developed by a collective of lawyers, ethicists, biotechnologists, and
anthropologists, with the aid of the general public, through a detailed and specific
referendum. The test should be incorporated into the relevant patent acts involved, to
make them as independent as possible from the “morals of the day” and to prevent
administrative agencies, such as the PTO and EPO, from developing their own. Note in
this respect the PTO’s exclusion from patentability of human/animal chimaeras, supra
note 118. For possible ethical rules, see supra note 158. The scholars, who favor
exclusion of any moral limitation on patentability because patent law should only be
directed at the technology, would possibly agree with the patentability of human beings;
their exclusion is entirely based on the PTO’s invocation of morality. Although they
could be correct in agreeing thereto, further research needs to be done, and important
policy decisions need to be taken, before these far-reaching standpoints can be
appropriately defended. The same applies to the moral implications of patentability of
transgenic animals, particularly because of the unclear biological distinction between
animals and human beings. Moreover, one should not ignore that other inventions than
those directed at transgenic animals are not at the crossroad of biology and technology,
and therefore fit in perfectly with the patent system as it was originally framed. Debates
about what is “good” and what is “wrong” are initiated now because of the involvement
of organisms with a high psychological capacity. Legal scholars, legislators and patent
officers cannot completely withdraw from this debate and hide behind the argument that
patent law is only directed at technology. Patent law was directed at technology only;
presently, it is directed at biotechnology as well.
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5. Human-Based Inventions
Both the patent laws of the U.S. and the EU more or less
exclude human-related inventions from patentability. EU patent
law contains a statutory exclusion, whereas the exclusion in the
U.S. is based on the policy of the PTO. In view of the broad
impact of patentability of transgenic humans (or animals), it may
be highly desirable to include a particular statutory provision in
U.S. patent law that deals with this issue. Moreover, both regimes
lack a clear definition of what constitutes a “human being” and
what constitutes an “animal.” In view of the rapidly advancing
biotechnology, these definitions should be made and incorporated
into patent law.473
6. Enablement
Both the patent regimes of the U.S. and the EU lack an
appropriate and workable standard for disclosure of the invention
by a patent applicant. That this is caused by the expression of a
gene in an animal may not be readily observable. This lack of
disclosure has both an internal and external impact (respectively
towards the patent office and towards third parties who request
samples) that should be addressed by the legislatures and/or patent
offices of both the U.S. and the EU.
Nevertheless, in the U.S., the PTO applies a stringent test of
enablement in the course of patent litigation. It requires that an
invention be fully repeatable and patent applicants can narrowly
and specifically describe their invention in the application (the
animal that is or expresses the invention). Conversely, in the EU,
the EPO does not apply a strict test of enablement, since otherwise
no patents could be issued for transgenic animals. The exclusion
of animal races, as continues to be the case in EU patent law,
forces applicants to formulate their invention as broadly as
possible so as to not claim explicitly an animal that belongs to a
particular race. They will, therefore, claim a patent for an
invention that is directed at a species or even higher taxonomical
473

The definitions suggested by scholars may not suffice. See supra note 421. A
multidisciplinary approach by lawyers, ethicists, and biologists may provide a workable
definition.
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units, and such a claim may be awarded, whereas from a
biotechnological point of view their invention most likely does not
affect these units, and only affect, a particular race or some races.
This leads to overbroad patents, which are contrary to the goals of
patent law. The EPO should, therefore, more strictly apply the
enablement requirement, in line with the approach of the PTO. In
case the EU prefers to allow transgenic animals to be patented, the
EPC and the patent laws of the member states should be revised
and the exclusion of patentability of animal races excluded; other
requirements of patent law, such as the enablement requirement,
should not be sacrificed.
7. Third Party Interests
Clearly, third party interests are better protected by EU patent
law than by U.S. patent law. First, anyone who objects to a certain
patent can file opposition against it until nine months after its
initial issuance.474 Anyone can be heard through this procedure,
and the EPO takes opposition seriously. The initial uncertainty of
the patentee (until nine months after the grant) is compensated by
his/her increased certainty afterwards. After issuance of the patent,
most, if not all, objections against the patent are known and they
have been considered by the EPO (and the newspaper reading
public). The patent will less likely be subjected to societal
objection and action on the political level. Second, designated
authorities are empowered to issue compulsory licenses in case
there is, for example, a pressing social need.475 The specificity and
narrowness of the underlying competence ensures that this
situation will not lead to uncertain patents.476 Hence, neither
patentees nor society will suffer from an uncertain patent system.
A compulsory license does, of course, touch upon the
exclusiveness of the patent right. One should bear in mind,
474

EPC, supra note 179, art. 99.
The compulsory licensing exemptions of the EPC and the patent laws of the EU
member states derive from TRIPS, supra note 454, article 30. See Correa, supra note
458, at 330–33 (describing TRIPS’ grounds for granting a compulsory license and their
workings).
476
See Mossinghot & Kuo, supra note 447, at 547 (arguing that compulsory licenses
should be part of a global patent system).
475

3-KOOPMAN FORMAT

2002]

12/12/02 3:19 PM

PATENTABILITY OF TRANSGENIC ANIMALS

199

however, that patent law does not provide absolute proprietary
rights, but relative ones that are limited in many ways, such as
duration. These limits are imposed for general societal reasons, for
which the exclusive right itself was also created. Patent offices’
application of the requirements of, and exclusions from,
patentability changes continuously to meet the demands of our
time, of new types of inventions and their inventors. This is
especially so with animal biotechnology, which, for example,
shown by the particularly low standard of novelty that is applied to
enable patentability of entire animals. It does not make any sense
to change the limits of the patent right only in favor of patentees
and not to their detriment, in case both could be beneficial to
society at large. Adequate pecuniary compensation to the patentee,
and a listing of a specified and limited number of purposes for
which these licenses can be granted, with sufficient opportunity of
representation, review and appeal, should safeguard the interests of
patentees while at the same time protect those of society.477 In
view hereof, U.S. patent law should be adapted to allow third-party
interests to be included in the examination of the patent
application, or to be set forth in another fashion. Additionally, a
system for compulsory licensing of patents on transgenic animals
should be set up, and the regimes of the U.S. and the EU
harmonized accordingly.
Although development of a uniform global patent system may
be considered ideal for adequate and appropriate patent protection,
such a system is not likely to be formed in the near future.478
Decisive steps should be taken by legislators to substantially
harmonize the patent laws of the U.S. and the EU, at least insofar
as the patentability of transgenic animals is concerned.

477

See Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical
Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 843–44 (2001)
(arguing that compulsory licenses should play a role in patent law for further research and
to prevent anticompetitive behavior).
478
See Meller, supra note 462; North, supra note 53, at 139.
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CONCLUSION
Biotechnology promises various beneficial applications for
both human beings and animals. Accordingly, research and
development of these applications may be necessary. In view of
the far-reaching and great impact of biotechnological applications
on the environment, the formation and development of “life” and,
thus, evolution, responsible development is necessary as well.
Patent law may be the legal instrument by which the
biotechnological developments can, on one hand, be stimulated
and enhanced, and, on the other, be controlled and guided. The
manner in, and extent to, biotechnological inventions, such as
transgenic animals, can be patented by the inventors will have a
profound influence on the pace at which their development takes
place. Inventors need to make investments, and investments need,
at the least, to be recouped. Society needs information about the
state of technology at a certain moment, in order to stimulate
continuance of technological developments. Patent law connects
these interests; governments through their patent offices grant
inventors temporary monopolies on the exploitation of their
invention, in return for a description thereof. Therefore, patent law
has become an instrument for enhancing biotechnological
development as well. In view of the strong incentive most
inventors have to apply for patents for their inventions, patent law
may also serve society’s interest in guiding and controlling the
development of these inventions. Patent offices may assess the
non-technological aspects of an invention, as described in the
patent application—for example, the benefits of the invention for
humankind and the dangers and other negative consequences that
may derive from it. The balance that is struck will determine the
rate at which biotechnological developments will proceed
responsibly.
Both the patent regimes of the U.S. and the EU provide patents
for transgenic animals, either directly or via a patent on a process
that extends to the animal. In the EU, however, patent protection
may also be obtained via a patent on a gene that has been inserted
and expressed in an animal. This manner of protection for
transgenic animals is not available in the U.S. Both European and
U.S. patent law permit patents for products that, except for minor
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alterations, exist in nature. The patent offices and/or courts apply a
low standard for novelty and nonobviousness (inventive step), and
for what constitutes “technology” and is “man-made.” Thus, both
regimes offer broad opportunities for an inventor to obtain a patent
for his/her animal biotechnological inventions, including
transgenic animals.
Given the degree of modification of the animals concerned, one
may doubt whether the standards that patent offices apply in this
context are appropriate. Greater insight into the actual impact of
the biotechnological application on the animal is needed, in order
to allow patent offices to determine more accurately where the
influence and workings of the invention end and the natural animal
remains. In the U.S., the PTO’s examination of patent applications
does not necessarily include considerations of a non-technical
nature, such as the animal suffering that may derive from the
claimed invention. Conversely, these considerations are included
in the examination of patent applications for transgenic animals in
the EU. The EPO’s examination of the various interests occurs
through a balancing test. It balances the expected benefits of the
invention with the expected disadvantages, such as damages to the
environment and animal suffering. Both patent regimes exclude
inventions that embrace human materials from patentability to a
greater or lesser extent. Nevertheless, both regimes lack clear
definitions for what constitutes material of human origin, and what
constitutes human beings and animals. The formation of these
definitions, and their incorporation into patent law by the
legislature or into the patent offices’ guidelines, is very important,
for the technology will provide more and more potentially
interesting and useful possibilities to combine genetic parts of
human beings with the genetic parts of animals.
In the U.S., animal varieties, races, and species can be
patented. In the EU, only animal varieties that are not claimed as
such can be patented. This forces applicants to draft broader
claims—most likely broader than is justified by their actual
invention. At the same time, the standard for enablement has been
lowered by the EPO, whereby inventors can actually obtain these
broad patents. This will not serve the prime goals of patent law
and weakens the connection and balance that patent law provides
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between the interests of patentees and the interests of society. In
the U.S., inventors can focus their claim on their actual invention,
regardless whether such comprises a variety, race, or species.
Subsequently, the PTO can apply a strict and traditional standard
for enablement, thus allowing for patents that are justified by the
invention. This approach serves the goals of patent law in a better
way. Given the autonomy of the national patent offices and courts
in the EU, referenced exclusion from patentability of varieties and
races, and the low standard of enablement set by the EPO, may not
be adhered to on the national level. On one hand, this may serve as
a safeguard against said broad unjustified patents and, on the other,
this may create legal uncertainty for patentees. This may
undermine the function of patent law, and particularly will frustrate
the objectives of the EPC.
Both regimes give broad scopes to the patents granted on
transgenic animals; offspring may be included. In the EU,
however, the patent on the initial product generally also covers
animals multiplied by non-sexual reproduction from those
products, such as cloning. This seems to contrast with the overall
situation in the U.S. Under U.S. law, “outsiders” do not have
means at their disposal to influence the process through which the
PTO grants patents. Also, they cannot challenge the scope,
contents and validity of patents granted, other than on grounds of
“prior art.” Conversely, in the EU the EPC provides for an
opposition procedure to anyone who objects to the application or
issuance of a patent by the EPO, e.g., on moral grounds. This
procedure recognizes the universal and far-reaching impact of
animal biotechnology and gives interested parties a chance to be
involved and heard. The patent regimes of the EU provide for
farmers’ and breeders’ exceptions to the broad scope of transgenic
animal patents—this may serve their economic need. The U.S.
patent regime lacks such provisions. This may economically
burden small breeders and farmers who want to acquire and use
patented animal material. Also, the patent regimes of the EU
generally provide for compulsory licensing, whereas such a system
is foreign to U.S. patent law. Compulsory licensing may provide
an escape to situations wherein a patentee ignores a pressing
societal need for use of the patented invention and is not willing to
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license at all for a reasonable royalty. Since the designated
authorities in the EU rarely grant compulsory licenses, and if they
do, only against reasonable royalties, patentees do not have to fear
significant weakening of their position under a regime that
provides for these licenses.
The European patent regime takes account of moral and
societal concerns that are related to transgenic animals. The EPO
considers these concerns directly under the exclusionary provisions
of the EPC, and also pursuant to oppositions filed by “outsiders” in
the opposition procedure. This is a signal of responsible patent
policy, but the EPO’s formalistic approach regarding EPC article
53(b)’s exclusion of animal varieties and, consequently, the low
standard it sets for enablement conflicts with the goals and
function of patent law as well. This is a signal of irresponsible
patent policy. Conversely, the PTO’s purely technological and
narrow approach toward the patentability of transgenic animals
ignores the important non-technological interests that are involved
and is a signal of irresponsible patent policy. Its strict application
of the enablement requirement is a signal of responsible patent
policy and serves the primary objectives of patent law best. The
low standards that are applied by both the EPO and the PTO for
“traditional” conditions for patentability, such as novelty and
nonobviousness, are indications of a pro-patent approach that may
lead to patents that are unjustified by the inventions. This is a
signal of irresponsible patent policy.
The discrepancies between U.S. and European patent law
concern important issues; e.g., whether countries should enhance
technological developments neutrally without paying attention to
their moral and social consequences; or whether it should be
recognized that patent law does not function in a social vacuum,
but is one of the instruments with which we govern and direct our
societies, both in their technical and ethical character. Clearly, this
author favors the latter approach. Another issue would be the
degree to which principles of patent law, for example full
disclosure and repeatability of the invention in exchange for the
patent, should be negated to accommodate the needs of present
inventors and their inventions. Clearly, this author favors a
conservative approach, deviating not too much from the initial
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patent law approach, unless such can be founded in extensive legal
and biological knowledge and understanding. The universal
impact of biotechnology requires a universal stimulus and
guidance. This can only be achieved by harmonization of patent
law.
This cannot be achieved easily through multilateral
processes. Thus, it is necessary for legislators in the respective
jurisdictions to pursue harmonization of their patent laws
multilaterally and to adjust these laws fully to the need of our time.
As they say, “procrastination is the thief of time,” and it may also
become the thief of many promising developments or the
accomplice of irresponsibility and its impact on future life and
society. Cum tacent clamant!479
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[By their silence, they emphasize it even more!]

